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## **MOSQUITOES AND MALARIA DECIMATE THE BRITISH ARMY, THE FAILURE OF THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 1807**

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### **Abstract**

In the British campaign of 1807, the leaders lacked experience with Egyptian weather conditions, as the campaign occurred during the Khamasin wind season, which was capable of disrupting the British army. Poor planning led the invading forces to encamp at Lake Mariout at the beginning of the campaign and at Lake Edku during the second attack on Rosetta. This was accompanied by a horrific spread of mosquitoes in Lake Edku, which was the base for the army's ships. Their commander, Fraser, took refuge there, sitting on one of the ships. He did not participate in the battle in which the people of Rosetta defeated the British army. He was attacked by mosquitoes, which spread malaria among the invading forces, forcing them to flee, leading to the subsequent humiliating withdrawal from Egypt. This is the main theme of the research, which clearly demonstrates that natural and climatic conditions can defeat the mightiest armies. The British army, who committed the most horrific massacres - without mercy - during the invasion of Egypt were unable to prevent divine vengeance by confronting an enemy they had no plans to resist.

The research reviews the developments that accompanied the spread of the malaria epidemic among the British forces, just as the Khamasin winds and the spread of malaria were a reason for the defeat of the British army and its withdrawal from Egypt. It covers two main themes: The British campaign against Egypt, through the factors that led to the failure of the British campaign, include the Khamasin winds and malaria epidemic, the British Commanders' Ignorance of the Climate in Egypt, and the Reaction to the Disastrous Defeat of the British Army.

**Keywords:** The British campaign of 1807, Egyptian weather conditions, the Khamasin wind season, Lake Mariout, Lake Edku, Rosetta, mosquitoes, Fraser, malaria, the British Army.

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**First: Introduction: The British Campaign on Egypt** The French campaign in Egypt drew the attention of the Western world to Egypt and its strategic location, especially England. This resulted in the attempted invasion of Egypt by the British campaign (1907) against Alexandria and Rosetta, which the Egyptians repelled a few years later.

Like the French, the British army was now plagued by disease, and its hospitals were overcrowded. The British lost a total of 692 soldiers to various diseases, the most important of which were plague, dysentery, and yellow fever. Of the 7,886 soldiers, 158 were sent to England as cripples-blind, paralyzed, or amputees.

The British commanders' ignorance of Egypt's climate is well-documented. The campaign took place in March and April, unlike the French campaign in July 1798. This period was also a period of rainstorms in Alexandria and Rosetta in March, along with severe cold and high sea levels. These affected the troops both on Lake Mariout during the campaign's landing and at Lake Edku after the withdrawal from Rosetta following the second defeat.

The increased nitrogen content in the air caused the soldiers to feel lethargic, shiver, and experience shortness of breath. The hot, dusty khamasin winds (the sirocco) also blew from February to June, causing a rapid rise in temperature and a drop in visibility. These winds caused the widespread spread of Egyptian ophthalmia, or spring eye disease, among the troops, affecting almost all of them. This, according to the campaign commander, caused chaos among them to an alarming degree. The situation was made worse by the winds, which brought with them all the sand, insects, and other pests that accompany this calamity. This was especially true since the northern lakes, including Lake Edku, are a breeding ground for mosquitoes. The Khamasin winds contributed to the rampage of these insects, which ferociously attacked the British army. This confirms the grave error committed by the commanders in choosing an inappropriate date and location. This reminds us of what happened to the French campaign, where the outbreak of the plague was a major factor in its end. Only two thousand Frenchmen remained fit to fight. The plague spread among the soldiers and claimed the lives of French doctors, despite the fact that they had begun to establish quarantine centers to monitor travelers and detain them for 40 days. The colonial aims of the British army were confirmed from the first day of the occupation of Alexandria, as the doctrine of plunder and looting emerged among the campaign leaders, reminiscent of what the Ottomans did when they occupied Egypt, looting its resources and transporting them to Istanbul, on the orders of Selim I.

This research examines the adverse environmental conditions faced by British campaign (1807) during their invasion of Egypt. In the French campaign, the terrible spread of the plague devastated the French army, claiming the lives of tens of thousands of troops. This prompted its commanders to quickly withdraw from Egypt to preserve the remaining army, most of who died as a result of the epidemic.

The khamasin winds, mosquitoes, malaria, and plague were natural allies that exhausted the European campaigns in Egypt. Cannons and popular resistance were not the only obstacles facing the British campaigns in Egypt. The khamasin winds, hot and dusty desert storms, were a deadly natural weapon that exhausted European soldiers unaccustomed to the harsh Egyptian climate and significantly impacted the military operations launched from Alexandria. Although the city of Alexandria itself was occupied relatively quickly in both campaigns, the real suffering began when the invading forces attempted to move outside the city walls. The campaign was exposed to harsh weather conditions that affected its progress and results; it faced extreme heat and high humidity in Egypt, as well as sandstorms and strong winds, which affected the health of the soldiers and their equipment. Heavy rains sometimes disrupted the movement of soldiers and equipment.

As for the difficulties faced by the British invasion of Alexandria in 1807, although the fall of Alexandria to the British forces led by General Alexander Mackenzie Fraser in March 1807 appeared easy on the surface, this initial success concealed a series of serious difficulties and challenges that precipitated the failure of the British campaign in Egypt as a whole. The difficulties were not initially purely military, but rather a complex mix of political miscalculations, logistical challenges, and the hostile environment in which the British forces found themselves. The most significant difficulties facing the conquest of Alexandria and its aftermath were the following:

1. Strategic Isolation: After capturing the coastal city, General Fraser found himself in a dilemma. He lacked the strength to penetrate the Delta, and at the same time, remaining in Alexandria without supplies from the Delta was impossible in the long term. This isolation led him to make the disastrous decision to send two expeditions to capture Rosetta, the main source of food supplies. This decision led to a crushing defeat that sealed the fate of the entire campaign.

In short, the conquest of Alexandria was a short-lived tactical success, but it was the beginning of a resounding strategic failure. The difficulties lay not in the capture of the city

itself, but in the immediate aftermath of this occupation, which revealed the weakness of British planning and the strength of the emerging Egyptian resistance.

The impact of the khamasin and mosquitoes on the British troops was similar to that suffered by the French, but was more severe because the campaign coincided with the peak of the season.

2. The spread of eye diseases: The khamasin winds were a direct cause of the spread of inflammatory eye diseases and vernal conjunctivitis among British soldiers. Egyptian catarrh: A hidden enemy that exhausted British troops in the 1807 campaign. The defeat of the British forces in their 1807 campaign in Egypt was not limited to fierce military resistance in Rosetta. They also faced another enemy, a silent and exhausting one: the contagious eye disease known historically as "Egyptian Ophthalmia." This disease, which medical historians today believe was a severe and contagious form of bacterial conjunctivitis, was one of the most significant health challenges facing European armies in Egypt during that era. Numerous British medical and military sources have documented the devastating impact of this disease on the soldiers of Fraser's expedition.

Experts attribute the spread of the disease among the British forces to a combination of factors in the Egyptian environment at the time:

- Climatic Conditions: The hot, dry, and windy conditions of the atmosphere, carrying sand and dust, irritated the eyes and made them more susceptible to infection.
- Flies and Mosquitoes: Played a major role in transmitting the infection from one person to another.
- Pathogens: Bacteria such as *Haemophilus influenzae* are believed to be the main cause of the acute infection.
- Poor Hygiene: Overcrowding in barracks and camps, and a lack of awareness of personal hygiene and transmission methods, contributed to the rapid spread of the disease among soldiers. Thus, the impact of Egyptian conjunctivitis on British troops was significant. The infection caused severe symptoms, including severe eye inflammation, swollen eyelids, profuse purulent discharge, and painful sensitivity to light. In severe cases, the disease led to corneal ulceration and permanent loss of vision, rendering large numbers of soldiers unable to fight or participate in military operations. Reports indicate that large numbers of British prisoners captured by Egyptian forces after the Rosetta battles were suffering from this disease, which exacerbated their suffering.

While the military failure at Rosetta remains the direct cause of the British campaign's defeat, the outbreak of the Egyptian catarrh epidemic was undoubtedly a significant factor in weakening the soldiers' morale and sapping their fighting ability, contributing to the overall image of a military campaign that ended in failure and withdrawal from Egypt.

- **Hindering Military Operations:** Poor weather conditions, poor visibility, and extreme heat hampered British military movements, particularly during their failed attempt to advance toward Rosetta, where they faced a severe defeat.

In both cases, the Khamasin winds posed an unexpected strategic challenge. This natural phenomenon proved to be a "hidden army" that fought alongside the Egyptians, weakening a militarily superior enemy and demonstrating that knowledge of the terrain and its climate is as important as weaponry in deciding battles.

A study of the events and dangers faced by the French campaign reveals that neither the British fleet's victory over the French fleet at Abu Qir, nor the decisive Egyptian resistance against the campaign, were the primary reasons for the French to flee with the remainder of their forces. The spread of the plague was the primary reason for the demise of the French forces, the defeat of the campaign, and its withdrawal from Egypt.

In the British campaign, the campaign's leaders lacked experience with Egyptian weather conditions, as the campaign occurred during the Khamasin wind season, which was capable of disrupting the British army's mood. Poor planning led the invading forces to encamp at Lake Mariout at the beginning of the campaign and at Lake Edku<sup>1</sup> during the second attack on Rosetta. This was compounded by the horrific spread of mosquitoes in Lake Edku, which served as a base for the army's ships. Their commander, Fraser, took refuge there, sitting on one of the ships. He did not participate in the battle in which the people of Rosetta defeated the British army. He was decimated by mosquitoes, which spread malaria among the invading forces, forcing them to flee, leading to the subsequent humiliating withdrawal from Egypt.

The research reviews the developments that accompanied the spread of the causes and manifestations of the spread of malaria among the British forces. The spread of the plague among the French forces was a major reason for the defeat and withdrawal of the campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> Lake Edku is one of the lakes in Egypt, the lake lies to the west of the city of Edku, and it connects to the Mediterranean Sea.

The Khamasin winds and the spread of malaria were also a major reason for the defeat and withdrawal of the British army from Egypt.

## **Second: Mosquitoes and Malaria Defeat the British Campaign**

### **1. The Course of the Campaign on Alexandria and Rosetta**

As for the British campaign, England sought to take decisive action against the Turkish government with the aim of seizing the city of Alexandria<sup>1</sup> [1]. There is a document confirming the complete Ottoman complicity and explicit approval of this campaign, which historians have long convinced us was the result of the conflict between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. This document confirms the betrayal and collusion of the Mamluk leaders and Mohamed Ali, who were willing to allow Britain to occupy Egypt in exchange for their continued rule.

This document is a letter from Lord Hawkesbury, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Henry Addington's government, dated May 19, 1801, addressed to Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, when he directed negotiations with the Turks: "I will clearly and conspicuously announce to the Turkish Ministers that, in the event of the French being expelled from Egypt, it is the firm and irrevocable intention of His Majesty to restore the whole of Egypt to the Sublime Porte, until general peace is achieved or for a short period to be agreed upon at a later date. An English garrison will be stationed on certain parts of the coast, with a view to consulting on the necessary means of protecting Egypt against any future project of invasion which the French Government may retain. I propose to the Turks the dispatch of an English armed force to protect Egypt. This force will offer its assistance only on condition that the Turks in return grant certain commercial concessions to England." This plan was approved by the British government and sent to Lord Elgin at the end of July 1801. It is a complete organizational plan including:

1. Determining the rights, privileges, and territorial authority of the Mamluks, as well as the nature and extent of the military service they should provide, provided it does not conflict with the benefits granted to them.
2. Paying a portion of public revenues to a regular military establishment to be formed, under

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<sup>1</sup> This valuable book includes the publication of documents of the 1807 campaign on the English side, starting from the introduction to the campaign until its end.

the supervision and control of British officers, with Turkish soldiers stationed in Egypt.

Implementation of this plan was postponed until after the expiration of the treaty signed on January 5, 1799, between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which marked the beginning of military cooperation between the two countries. This was also after the expiration of the eight-year period during which Britain guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, thus committing itself to reconquering Egypt and nominally restoring it to the Ottoman Empire. The campaign thus began in March 1807. By adopting such a plan, Britain ensured that the country's forces, commanded by British officers, would be capable of defending Egypt, without foreign assistance, against the French attempt. Therefore, the letters included the expansion of the invasion after Alexandria to Rosetta and Rahmania, followed by Damietta and the remaining ports, and finally all of Egypt.

The British House of Commons requested the transfer of troops to Istanbul and the necessary arrangements and preparations for the transfer of battalions of five thousand men to Egypt to seize Alexandria to prevent the French from setting foot and to impose a protectorate over Egypt to force it to maintain at all times friendly relations with Great Britain. This would be done with the help of the Mamluk beys who were vying for power within the country. It also requested the selection of an officer from the army command to make the necessary preparations for the expected invasion of Alexandria under the command of Lord Collingwood [1].

England launched its campaign against Egypt under the leadership of General Fraser [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. It had agreed with Mohamed Bey al-Alfi [9], [10], [11], [12], the Mamluk leader [13]<sup>1</sup>, to support and strengthen it, provided that the Mamluks would seize

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<sup>1</sup> Mohamed Bey al-Alfi was one of the Mamluk princes in Egypt. He was one of Murad Bey's most prominent Mamluks. When the French campaign came to Egypt, he fled with Murad Bey to Upper Egypt. Bonaparte made al-Alfi Palace his headquarters. After Murad Bey allied with the French and became the governor of Upper Egypt, al-Alfi withdrew from him and continued fighting the French. When the British arrived in Egypt to expel the French, he allied with them. However, after their withdrawal from Egypt in 1802, according to the Treaty of Amiens, he came into direct confrontation with the Turks, so he took refuge in Upper Egypt. He continued to correspond with the British, urging them to return to Egypt and help him seize the throne, which had been assumed by Mohamed Ali Pasha. He defeated two armies sent by Mohamed Ali to fight him in Beni Suef and Rahmaniyah, but he died on January 28, 1807, while returning to Upper Egypt after his failure in the siege of Damamhur, months before the arrival of his British allies in their campaign against Egypt.

control of the country's government. However, Egypt refused to surrender to this invasion; instead, it resisted it with all its might and strength. The nation emerged with the same spirit that had prevailed in the face of the French campaign [14], [15], [16], [17] a spirit of resistance, dedication, sacrifice, and defense until the campaign ended in disappointment and failure. News of the British campaign reached Egypt before its arrival, and people learned of it from letters arriving from Istanbul. They began preparing to resist it, just as they had prepared to resist the French campaign. Sayyid Omar Makram assumed the leadership of the popular resistance, displaying his known courage and resolve [18], [19].

Al-Jabarti described the state of war prior to the campaign, stating in his book, "The Events of Dhu al-Hijjah 1221 (February 1807): 'The people of Alexandria began fortifying their castles and towers, as well as Abu Qir. Katkhuda Bey (Mohamed Ali Pasha's deputy) sent someone to oversee the construction of a castle in Burullus. Unrest and confusion arose in Egypt, and prices of imported goods soared. Meetings were held in Katkhuda Bey's house and the house of Sayyid Omar al-Naqib, and they agreed to send these correspondences to Mohamed Ali Pasha in the tribal area, accompanied by Diwan Effendi (his secretary) [20], [21]. The British fleet arrived in Alexandria in March 1807, and he immediately sent news of its arrival to Cairo. Mohamed Ali Pasha was away fighting the Mamluks in Upper Egypt. When news of its arrival spread, people's hearts were stirred and anxiety grew. The rulers met to consult on what should be done to defend the country."

Al-Jabarti said: "When these letters arrived, Katkhuda Bey, Hassan Pasha, Bonaparte the Treasurer, Tahir Pasha, the Defterdar, the Raznamji, and the rest of their notables met at sunset and consulted about it. Then they unanimously decided to send the news of this to Mohamed Ali Pasha, asking him to come with the soldiers who were with him, to prepare for what was more deserving of attention. They did that and went home after part of the night. They sent this letter to him on Friday morning, accompanied by two camel drivers. The news spread and the people started to talk about it a lot." The English campaign came in accordance with a previous agreement with Al-Alfi, the Mamluk leader, but divine destiny decreed that Al-Alfi would die before the campaign reached Egypt. Had it advanced its arrival forty days and arrived while Al-Alfi was still alive and surrounded by thousands of fighters, it would have been possible that the course of events in Egypt would have changed. However, it arrived after Al-Alfi had died and his supporters and army had been scattered. This was one of the reasons that divine providence had prepared, along with the resistance

that Egypt had shown, for the failure of this campaign.

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During the Anglo-Turkish War (1807–1809), the Royal Navy and the British Army launched a campaign to occupy the Egyptian city of Alexandria, led by General Alexander Mackenzie Fraser, in order to secure a British base of operations against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. The campaign was part of a larger strategy against the French, who were allied with the Ottoman Sultan Selim III [22], [23]. The reasons for this campaign stemmed from the estrangement and hostility between England and Turkey due to Turkey's alignment with France. England resented the Turkish government's policy and, along with Russia, conspired to plot against it. Relations between the two countries deteriorated until war was declared between them. The English fleet, led by Admiral Duckworth, entered the Dardanelles. England intended to strike Turkey in Egypt, thereby achieving two goals: humiliating Turkey and fulfilling its ambitions in Egypt.

Preparations for the campaign began in November 1806, when orders were given to Major General Fraser to proceed to Alexandria and contact Major Misset, the British Consul, to provide him with information on the strength and organization of the Turkish forces and the state of the artillery in the forts in Alexandria [24], [25].

On January 26, 1807, Major Misset reported that the governor of Egypt had received orders from the Sublime Porte to place every vulnerable part of Alexandria on the defensive, and that he was planning to use every possible means to prevent a British invasion of the country. The Egyptians were on alert for the arrival of the British army. The city's commander had devoted all his efforts to urgently repairing the city walls, installing several cannons in the castles and forts, placing reinforcements to secure the entrances to the old and new ports, and supplying the troops with ammunition. However, the two forts, Cretan and Caffarelli, were in ruins, and the governor was unprepared to repair them. He was ignorant of the art of

strengthening these fortifications, which were inadequate for their purpose, and expected the native inhabitants to be unable to resist an attack by the British forces. Meanwhile, Drovetti, the French consul, was urging the governor of Alexandria to develop ways to defend his forces [1], The English army consisted of (6604) soldiers as follows: a cavalry platoon of (88), (46) horse, (217) Royal Artillery, (6) Royal Engineers, (24) staff, (1135) soldiers of the (35) Regiment, (884) the second battalion of the (78) Regiment, (805) Roll Regiment, (1019) snipers, (666) volunteers, in addition to (25) commanders headed by Major General Fraser .[26][1],<sup>1</sup>

An English ship arrived in the waters of Alexandria without announcing the reasons for its presence. Perhaps it was a reconnaissance ship to ascertain the situation in the port. On March 14, another warship arrived and summoned the English consul. He accepted the invitation and quickly set out to meet those on board. No sooner had he returned to the port than he dispatched several messengers carrying messages to distant destinations. The locals thought they were sent to the English subjects to summon them to the port. However, it later became clear that they were sent to the Mamluk beys in Upper Egypt to inform them of the imminent arrival of the English campaign and to summon them to Lower Egypt. These messages indicated that the campaign had come by prior agreement with Al-Alfi that the Mamluks would supply it with the men and equipment they had.

Al-Jabarti said: “About forty days after the death of Al-Alfi, the English aid arrived at the port of Alexandria and they went out to it. At that time, they were informed of the death of the aforementioned man, so it was not easy for them to return, so they sent to the Egyptian group (meaning the Mamluks), thinking that they had the traces of determination and help, asking them to come and the English would help them to return them to their kingdom.”

He said in another place, the gist of which is: “This group of Englishmen and those who joined them, whose number, as it was said, was six thousand, did not come to the border with the hope of taking Egypt, but rather their arrival and arrival was to help and support Al-Alfi against his opponents, by summoning them and seeking their aid. The reason for their delay in coming was the peace treaty that had been concluded between them and the Ottomans. When the disagreement occurred between them and him, they seized the opportunity and sent this group, and Al-Alfi was waiting for their arrival in Buhaira. When

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<sup>1</sup> He included a list of the names of the leaders in the report on boarding sailing ships.

he had to wait too long and Buhaira became too narrow for him, he departed with his armies, and God decreed his death in the Giza region. The English then arrived in Alexandria and found that he had died. They were unable to return, so they sent to the tribal princes, summoning them to be their assistants against their enemy, and saying to them, 'We came to your country to summon Al-Alfi to help and support him, but we found that Al-Alfi had died, and he is one person from you, and you are a group. So do not delay in arriving, for you will not find an opportunity after this, and you will regret it, after that, if you hesitate.'

It is clear from this that the English campaign (1807) was initiated by summoning Al-Alfi and his agreement with the English to occupy the country. This supports the truth, which is that the Mamluks were the creations of English policy and remained its creations until the country was freed from them. It is noteworthy in Al-Jabarti's account that he said: "The English did not come to the border with the hope of taking Egypt," etc. This is the statement of someone who did not understand the essence of English policy, and Al-Jabarti is excused for not understanding the true intentions of this policy, as he did not know its secrets. He is more deserving of being excused than those who, in 1882, more than seventy years after these events, imagined that the English came to Egypt to defend the throne of the Egyptian Khedivate. They should have understood that they had only come to occupy the country and extend their influence and control there.

Messitt sent a letter to Fraser (on March 15) informing him: "The French seem more disgusted and arrogant, and that they will regain their lost influence and are returning. The garrison of the city is very weak, and the people are very fond of the English, and they are more optimistic that the troops will occupy the city and the forts without firing a single shot." He told him that he "will be with the governor of the city, and when the fleet appears, I will persuade him to send a suitable person to negotiate a surrender. If he refuses, I will ask him to withdraw. I think that the landing should take place at Abu Qir, where the fleet will be safe, and the troops can land without disturbance, and the fort can be captured with only twenty men. Water is available on the coast between Abu Qir and Alexandria by digging to a depth of several feet, especially near the palm trees."

The first statement of the campaign was issued to the governor and residents of Alexandria on March 11, 1807, and read: "We, General Major Mackenzie Fraser and Captain Hallowell, Commanders of the Royal British Army, believe it appropriate to announce... "We have come to take possession of the port, city, and forts of Alexandria and the country belonging

to it, not as conquerors of the country, but to prevent the French from regaining their position there, and to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Our power is so great that it can dissolve all effective resistance. The people of Egypt have known the humanity, honor, and freedom of the English nation, which makes us confident that we will be welcomed and treated with good brotherhood. Accordingly, if we take possession of the country peacefully, individuals will be protected and personal property will be respected. If the opposite is true, it will be otherwise, and the garrison and the inhabitants will bear the consequences.”

The campaign reached Alexandria, whose people began to fortify its castles and towers, as well as Abu Qir [24]. As for the state of defense of Alexandria, the garrison did not reach (300) men, and although the commander of this city placed additional cannons, he did not have the necessary soldiers to operate them, as he was in dire need of ammunition. In such circumstances, it would be easy for the British force to occupy the city and its castles. Mohamed Ali sent aid to Rosetta, and he began to build a wall around the city and towers outside it, and he fortified the battalions surrounding its outskirts [27], [28]. On March 16, the British ship returned, followed by a large battleship and several other vessels. No sooner had March 17 dawned than the British fleet, consisting of twenty-five ships under Admiral Lewis, arrived and blocked the western entrance to the harbor by dropping anchor. That evening, the expedition's soldiers began disembarking at Ajami Beach. The British then marched to Alexandria and encamped beneath its walls. They sent a detachment to occupy the Abu Qir Fort, east of Alexandria. Two days of negotiations ensued between them and Amin Agha, the city's governor, which ended with him surrendering himself as a prisoner of war, along with the city's garrison, numbering approximately 300 fighters. The British entered Alexandria on the night of March 21 without firing a single shot.

The English then took control of Alexandria. Al-Jabarti, in his Muharram diary (1222), reported that fighting had broken out in Alexandria: "And heavy cannons were fired from the sea, and part of the large tower and the small towers were destroyed." He also mentioned that they: "They spread the rumor that Alexandria was immune to the English, and that they had ascended to Ras al-Tin and al-Ajami. The people of the country and the soldiers came out against them, fought them, and expelled them from the mainland. They landed on ships in defeat, burning two of their ships. The Ottoman and French forces reached them, and they fought them at sea, burned their ships, and slaughtered a large number of them.

Only a few of them remained." News arrived of the capture of Alexandria and the British

taking control of it on Thursday, the ninth of the month. They entered it and took possession of the towers on Sunday morning, and their military mast was stationed at the consul's agency. The English campaign consisted of two divisions, one under General Stewart, and the other under General Jacob. It is strange that the English would risk such a small number in the campaign against Egypt, while Bonaparte had only invaded it with an army of 36,000 fighters and one of the greatest naval fleets. However, this astonishment soon disappears when we realize that the English believed that they would not find any significant resistance in Egypt due to the unrest that tore it apart. On the other hand, they were relying on the Mamluk forces in Egypt.

Therefore, they did not take with them a force of cavalry, satisfied with what their Mamluk clients provided them. They believed that they would not be long in setting foot on Egyptian soil until the Mamluks from all over the country would rush to meet them and join them. When they entered Alexandria and saw no sign of them, the English consul sent a message asking their leaders to come and meet their saviors and protectors. When news of the occupation of Alexandria reached Cairo, it caused great concern among the people, especially when they learned that the governor of the port had surrendered the city without a fight. The leaders of the people began to meet and consult, and they decided to call on the people to volunteer to repel the British from the country.

It was said that the governor of Alexandria conspired with the British [1], [27], and that he held out for forty-eight hours to protect himself from the wrath of his government. The people did not open the gates quickly because they wanted to show their strength and because their morale had been broken by the long injustice. Once the line between the old port and Lake Mariout was attacked and the positions east of Alexandria were occupied, the Turkish soldiers surrendered their fortresses and the greater part of them fled, and the people soon surrendered [24], [26].

However, the claim of collusion has no solid evidence, and what the English mentioned in their letters to their government is sufficient. In the letter sent by Captain Hallowell to Vice Admiral Sir John Decorth on March 24, 1807, he states that: "When the ships docked at the eastern port and the invitation was sent to possess the castles and he promised to protect people and private property, the governor of the city refused and stated that he would defend himself until the last moment." He also states: "The general decided to land quickly so as not to give the people a chance to strengthen their position. On March 17, he landed between

(600) and (700) soldiers and (56) sailors under the command of Lieutenant Boxer on the beach near Lake Mariout without objection, and the Egyptian defenses were seized, and the positions east of Alexandria were occupied, thus cutting off communication between Alexandria and Rosetta. Apollo and the rest of the accompanying force arrived on March 19 and landed the soldiers in Abu Qir Bay (on March 20). The fortresses of Cavarelli and Cretan were seized, as well as two battleships. Two Turkish ships, a ship, and all their guns [1].

In another letter from Major General Fraser on March 25, he stated: "The Turks had dug a large trench in the west of the city, extending from Fort de Bien to Lake Mariout, supported by three cannons, topped with light rifles. (13) guns were stationed at Fort de Bien." He also stated: "This barrier was breached with very few losses, despite being subjected to heavy fire from cannons and small arms. Entry was made through the Pompeii Gate, where the fortress was ready to meet the English. The gate was fortified, and the soldiers and residents were lined up against the walls." Therefore, Fraser decided to head east, and battalions were sent to occupy Abu Qir and the intersection between Lake Mariout and El-Maadiyya, isolating Alexandria from the neighboring cities. "On March 20, I sent an official statement to the residents, via an Arab friend, urging them to force the governor to surrender. I also sent a peace flag, and he agreed to the surrender and signed it." One report mentions the number of dead and wounded in the March 18 attack, including the killing of one officer and six soldiers, and the wounding of an officer, a sergeant and eight soldiers [1].

In our opinion, the surrender of Alexandria was not easy, which negates what was mentioned that the city surrendered without firing a single shell from its cannons. The British acknowledgment of their dead and wounded is clear evidence of the city's resistance. Likewise, what was mentioned that the shooting did not stop until the people pleaded with the invaders, asking for safety, also contradicts what was stated in the British letters [24]. Rather, it can be said that the surrender came as a result of the city's siege and the cutting off of its supplies. The main reason for the surrender was the imbalance between the city's garrison and the invading forces. While the garrison numbered (467), including (215) soldiers, (44) riflemen, and (208) sailors and navigators, the number of the invading forces was (6,604), more than fourteen times that number, forcing the forces to surrender. We also find that the invading forces asked the residents to pressure the governor to surrender. He was also forced to do so because the city's wheat and rice supplies were only sufficient for two weeks [1]. The British issued a statement in which they showed their respect for mosques

and private property. They also granted the governor of Alexandria a guarantee of safety for himself and his soldiers, and permitted them to go anywhere they wanted except Istanbul [27].

Mohamed Ali was still in Upper Egypt fighting the Mamluk forces. When the first news of the campaign reached him, he was apprehensive and decided to return to Cairo. However, he met the news with composure and used cunning to break the Mamluk forces to ensure that they would not side with the British. He negotiated with their leaders to conclude a peace treaty with them. Their conditions for accepting the peace treaty were that they be left in control of Upper Egypt.

Mohamed Ali found that political necessity required a truce with them to avert the threat of the British campaign. He accepted this condition, provided that they pay him the tax of Upper Egypt and support him in fighting the British. The Mamluks agreed to this condition, and if Alfi Bey had been alive, he would not have accepted it. However, his successors were not bound to the British by the same bonds and covenants that Alfi had made to himself. Moreover, they feared damaging their reputation and being accused of treason if they joined the British, so they agreed to ally with Mohamed Ali. They were not sincere in their alliance; rather, they intended to wait until the results of the British campaign were revealed. If it won, they would side with it, but if it failed, they would maintain their alliance with Mohamed Ali. This was their custom in every era, to side with the victor. However, this position in itself benefited the Egyptian cause, as it deprived the British of a strong support on which they could rely in their campaign. Mohamed Ali left Upper Egypt and marched with his soldiers to Cairo. The Mamluks occupied the capitals of Upper Egypt and advanced to Giza. Major Messitt sent a letter to General Fraser (on March 23, 1807) requesting the occupation of Rosetta and Rahmaniya to ensure food supplies that would meet the needs of the army. Fraser decided to detach a portion of the forces to occupy Rosetta and Rahmaniya, and entrusted this to General Waukope and Brigadier General Mead. The number of forces amounted to 1,400 soldiers with a portion of the artillery, with orders to return to their places after completing the mission, provided that they leave sufficient garrisons in the two mentioned locations [1].

Petrucci, the English consul in Rosetta, had sent a letter to Fraser in which he confirmed: "The people of Rosetta, all of them, and at their head their leader, Sheikh Hassan Krit, are preparing to welcome the English to relieve them of the injustices they are suffering." This

letter was based on what Petrucci had received from Rossetti, the Merchant of Venice (on March 27), in which he said: “Sheikh Hassan had succeeded in the last few days in convincing the soldiers to evacuate the city, and they listened to him - it seems - and this is a comfort to the English and all the people [24].”

The English plan for the battle was for the Mamluks to advance on Cairo and occupy it, and for the English, aided by their fleet, to occupy Egypt's borders, advance inland, and seize control of the country's government, relying on their Mamluk proxies.

General Fraser, while still in Alexandria, received a report from Mr. Petrucci on the state of Egypt and a census of the forces there. He carefully examined this report and studied the situation to the best of his knowledge. He then decided to advance on Rosetta to occupy it and make it a military base from which to supply the army and from which to advance inland. He entrusted this mission to General Wycob, dispatching him with a force of 2,000 soldiers. This army set out from Alexandria on March 29<sup>th</sup>, heading for Rosetta. The army was within its walls the following day, and it began preparing to enter on the morning of 31 March.

On March 29, the forces moved towards Rosetta, where they landed at Khan al-Qawafil at the entrance to Lake Edku at four in the afternoon without any objection. The army advanced towards Rosetta, and the launches, short cannons and other army vessels, under the command of Captain Halloul, were docked at the Fort of Saint Julian (Qaitbay Citadel), ready to support the army's movements and attack if necessary. One of the letters states: “We were eager for the positive end of our hopes and thought that we would be crowned with success, but unfortunately the result was a severe defeat. The slight resistance at the beginning deceived us, and the army entered with little caution, as it was rained down on it by the fire of the Turks and Albanians who had closed the houses and were safe, and they killed many of our men. It was absolutely necessary to withdraw quickly, and we did so with the loss of some of our artillery and a cannon. General Wauchope, who commanded the battalion, was killed, and Major Mead was severely wounded in the head. The number of dead was four officers, (11) non-commissioned officers and (17) soldiers, while the wounded numbered nineteen officers, and (12) rows and (251) soldiers [1].”

Brigadier General Meade's plan was for his forces to advance to occupy Rosetta in three divisions: the first in the east through the orchards extending along the Nile, the second from the northern gate, and the third from the Alexandria Gate to the west. The British had occupied the Abu Mandour hills south of the city [24]. The city garrison (on March 20)

consisted of (250) men, which became (on March 26) of (550) after the Buhaira scout moved at the head of (300) men, and it was expected to reach (1500) men. Therefore, Wauckope hastened to carry out his mission hastily, without sufficient study and without securing his lines, as he began the attack (on March 29). The British army was provided with two days' provisions and two light cannons, each of which was equipped with only thirty cartridges, which Fraser believed was sufficient to subjugate Rosetta. Captain Taberna, the mission secretary, also believed that the enemy army (Rosetta) would never dare to confront a military detachment of Europeans [1].

The governor of Rosetta, Ali Bey al-Salankli, ordered the doors and windows of the houses to be closed to mislead the men of the campaign, and that the residents and soldiers should take shelter in the houses, ready to strike when they were given the signal to fire. The enemy soldiers were reassured and advanced towards the city and entered it safely, then spread out in the streets and markets. As soon as they dispersed in the city and thought that its people had left it, the order was given to fire, killing Wauckope, the commander of the campaign, and destroying many of the invading forces [26], [27].

The governor of Rosetta at the time was Ali Bey al-Salankli, a brave and perspicacious man whose morals differed greatly from Amin Agha, the governor of Alexandria. He had about 700 soldiers under his command, and he resolved to resist the British army, relying on the strength of the garrison and the participation of the local population in defending the city. To instill zeal in his soldiers and encourage them to fight bravely, he ordered the ferry boats to be moved to the eastern bank of the Nile, so that the garrison would not have a chance to retreat if they thought they could surrender as the Alexandria garrison had. When all the boats had been moved, and the soldiers and residents felt, upon the approach of the British army, that the sea was behind them and the enemy was in front of them, their resolve to resist was strengthened. Ali Bey ordered the garrison to retreat into the city and that they and the residents should take shelter in their homes, ready to strike, and not to initiate any movement until the signal to fire was given.

The English advanced, and when they found no trace of resistance outside the city, they thought that its garrison had intended to evacuate and surrender it, following the example of Amin Agha, the governor of Alexandria. They entered the city streets with confidence, and they had been exhausted by walking in the sands from Alexandria to Rosetta. They spread out in the roads and markets, seeking places to seek refuge and rest. But they had hardly

traveled through the houses and the city had encompassed them, when Ali Bey gave the order to open fire, and bullets came at them from every direction.

The people began to fire from the windows and roofs, terror spread in their hearts, and many of them fell dead in the streets. General Wauchope was killed by a bullet that killed him, and many of his officers were killed. Panic seized the souls of the English, and they fled. The incident ended with the defeat of the English army, and the retreat of its survivors from Rosetta in a state of despair and failure. They retreated to Alexandria via Abu Qir, and the number of those killed among them reached about (170) dead and (250) wounded, and the Egyptians took (120) prisoners from them.

Al-Jabarti mentioned the following about the incident of Rosetta: “On Friday, the fourteenth of Muharram, 1222, news came from the port of Rosetta, stating that a group of Englishmen had arrived in Rosetta on the morning of Tuesday, the twenty-first (March 31, 1807), and had entered the country. The people of the town and the soldiers with them were alert and prepared in the alleys, corners, and attics of the houses. When they reached the town, they attacked them from every direction, so they threw down the weapons they had in their hands and asked for safety, but they did not heed that. They seized them, slaughtered a large number of them, and took the rest captive. A group fled to the Damanhur region. When its scout heard what had happened, Rosetta was reassured and returned to the Dibi region and Mahallat al-Amir. He went out with those with him to the mainland, and encountered that group, so he killed some of them and took them captive. They sent messengers to Egypt with the good news, so they fired cannons and made a raid.”

The people of Rosetta had the lion's share in the defeat of the British army, because their military garrison was so small that it was unable to repel the advancing army. It was previously mentioned that news of the British campaign had spread throughout Egypt before its arrival, and people learned of it from the messages arriving from Istanbul, and the border areas began to prepare to resist it. The people of Rosetta or elsewhere refused to ask for reinforcements from Cairo's soldiers, because of their reputation for looting and plundering at that time, as most of them were Albanians, Dalat, and other Ottoman Sultanate mixes. The people preferred to take on the defense of the city themselves, and they bore most of the burden of resistance and fighting.

Al-Jabarti said: “On Tuesday, the 7th of Muharram in the year 1222 (March 7, 1807), they held a meeting in the judge's house, attended by sheikhs and notables. They mentioned that

when the orders came to fortify the borders, the Pasha (Mohamed Ali) sent Sulayman Agha with a group of soldiers and sent letters to the people of the borders and their governors, stating that if they needed soldiers, the Pasha should send them additional soldiers in addition to those he had sent. They replied that they were sufficient and did not need additional soldiers to come to them from Egypt, because if they increased in number in the country, corruption and devastation would come from them. So they held this meeting to prove this statement.”

It is clear from this that the people refused to ask the army for help, fearing the corruption they would cause, and that they had prepared themselves to bear the burdens of the fighting themselves. What supports this fact is that the facts of the campaign indicate that most of the military garrisons fled the field and did not confront the British army. What Amin Agha, the governor of Alexandria and the city garrison did in surrendering, was passed, and so did the Damanhour garrison. When news of the British occupation of Alexandria reached them, they evacuated Damanhour and withdrew to Fowa. The Damanhouris tried to dissuade them from their resolve and urged them to remain in the city to resist the British, but they refused to do anything but flee. The people sent to Sayyid Omar Makram informing him of their flight. Al-Jabarti said in this regard: “On the 17<sup>th</sup> of Muharram in the year 1222, a letter was received from the people of Damanhur, addressed to Sayyid Umar al-Naqib, stating that when the English ships entered Alexandria, the soldiers who were there fled and came to Damanhur. When the Kashif (ruler) in Damanhur and the soldiers with him saw them, they were very upset and decided to leave Damanhur. The notables of the region addressed them, saying, ‘How can you leave us and go without seeing any disagreement from us? We were among your greatest helpers in the previous two thousand-year wars, so how can we not help each other now in the English wars?’ They did not listen to what they said because of the intense fear that had entered them, and they packed up their belongings. The Kashif took out his baggage, his storehouse, and his cannons, left them, and went to Fawa that night. Then he sent for the baggage the next day. This is what happened, and we have informed you of it [28], [29].” It follows from the above that the victory in the Battle of Rosetta was due to the people, and that they were the ones who bore most of the burdens of the jihad and did their best in defending the city [30], [31], [32].

### **Third: Factors that Failed the British Campaign**

## **1. The Khamasin Winds and the Malaria Epidemic**

The Khamasin is a local dry, hot, and sandy wind that affects Egypt and the Levant. Similar winds blow in other parts of North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the entire Mediterranean Basin. These dry, sand-filled sandstorms blow intermittently in Egypt, usually fifty days after the onset of spring, hence their name. This phenomenon takes a slightly different form and occurs during the spring and fall seasons. When the storm passes over an area and lasts for several hours, it carries with it massive amounts of sand and dust from the deserts, traveling at speeds of up to 140 kilometers per hour. The humidity in the area drops, and temperatures rise above 45 degrees Celsius (114 degrees Fahrenheit). Reports indicate that sandstorms significantly hampered Napoleon's military campaigns in Egypt. When the plague reaches Egypt, it usually occurs in the spring; the disease is at its most severe during the Khamasin period [33].

One of the factors that contributed to the failure of this campaign was that the leaders chose an entirely inappropriate date to start the campaign and dock in Alexandria, which is exposed during this period to rain storms [34] and strong winds, reaching speeds of 53 to 61 km/h. It is known that during March, many marine storms are active, including: The Salloum storm: It occurs in early March and lasts for only two days. It is named after the westerly winds blowing from the Salloum direction in Matrouh Governorate. On the eighth day, the Hasoum storm begins and lasts for six days. It is northwesterly to northeasterly and sometimes rainy. It is characterized by severe lightning, thunder and rainfall, and is considered the last of the severe rain storms. On the fourteenth, there is the Baqee al-Hasoum wind, which lasts for two days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. On the twenty-second, there is the Shams al-Kabira wind, which lasts for three days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. On the twenty-ninth, there is the Awwa and Bard al-Ajouz wind, which lasts for three days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. It is considered the last of the cold winds, and the reason for naming it this name is because of the sounds of the winds, especially at night, and because its duration is unknown. On the second of April, there is the Baqee al-Awwa wind, which lasts for two days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy.

During Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798, French soldiers had difficulty dealing with the Khamasin: when the storm appeared "like a bloody speck in the distant sky," the Ottomans went for cover, while the French did not react until it was too late, and then suffocated and fainted amidst the thick, suffocating dust [35].

Malaria<sup>1</sup> is an infectious parasitic disease caused by the Plasmodium parasite, which is transmitted through the saliva of female Anopheles mosquitoes. It moves to the liver, multiplies, and is then released into the bloodstream, attacking and destroying red blood cells. This is accompanied by a group of symptoms, the most important of which are fever, anemia, and an enlarged spleen.

Malaria is caused by a single-celled organism from the Plasmodium family, which is transmitted to humans through the bite of a female Anopheles mosquito. This occurs when parasites present in the mosquito's saliva enter the human bloodstream. The parasites migrate to the liver, where they mature and multiply. Five species of Plasmodium can infect humans. Plasmodium falciparum is the most dangerous and most deadly, while Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium ovale, and Plasmodium malariae generally cause less severe symptoms than P. falciparum. P. knowlesi rarely causes disease in humans. Symptoms of malaria include shivering, twitching, fever, sweating, headache, nausea, vomiting, muscle aches, bloody stools, jaundice, convulsions, and fainting. A high temperature may be accompanied by chills, profuse sweating, and headache. Malaria causes symptoms similar to those of other illnesses, especially the flu. It is noted that the most dangerous types of malaria cause severe symptoms such as coma, especially in the case of cerebral malaria. They also cause anemia, intestinal infections, kidney failure, and shortness of breath.

Malaria causes anemia and yellowing of the skin due to the breakdown of red blood cells. Symptoms can progress rapidly in people with weakened immunity, leading to a dangerously high fever, sensory system damage, recurrent convulsions, and coma, eventually leading to death. In the case of malaria caused by the parasite P. falciparum, if left untreated, kidney failure, convulsions, memory and thinking impairment, and coma can result, eventually leading to death. Malaria can also reach the brain, where the parasite-infected and decomposing red blood cells can block blood vessels. This condition is called cerebral malaria. Symptoms are similar to those of influenza, and include tremors, chills, headache, persistent muscle aches, severe fatigue, nausea, vomiting, mild diarrhea, severe

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<sup>1</sup> Malaria: The word comes from the Latin word malus aria, meaning "bad air," referring to the breeding of malaria mosquitoes in swamps and stagnant water. The ancients believed that malaria was transmitted by swamp air. This is why the English called it "swamp fever," and the Arabs called it "baradaa" (poison) because it causes severe shivering.

gastrointestinal pain, symptoms of peptic ulcers, convulsions, and coma, which can lead to death. Symptoms appear within a week [36], [37].

## **2. The British Commanders' Ignorance of the Egyptian Climate**

The British commanders' ignorance of the Egyptian climate is well-documented. This is evidenced by the fact that the campaign took place in March and April, unlike the French campaign in July 1798. This period was also the period of rainstorms in Alexandria and Rosetta in March, along with severe cold and high sea levels. These conditions affected the troops, both at Lake Mariout during the campaign's landing and at Lake Edku after the withdrawal from Rosetta following the second defeat. The increased nitrogen content in the air caused the soldiers to feel lethargic, shiver, and experience shortness of breath. In addition, the hot and dusty khamasin winds [33] (the sirocco) blew from February to June, leading to a rapid rise in temperatures and a decrease in visibility. These winds caused widespread conjunctivitis and eye infections among the troops, affecting almost all of them. This, according to the campaign commander, led to a dangerous degree of chaos among them. The situation was made worse by the winds, which brought with them all the sand, insects, and other pests that accompany this calamity. This was especially true since the northern lakes, including Lake Edku, are a breeding ground for mosquitoes. The Khamasin winds contributed to the rampage of these insects, which ferociously attacked the British army. This confirms the grave error committed by the commanders in choosing an inappropriate date and location.

The waves continued to rise, and by morning, when the boats with the soldiers approached, it was found impossible to land. Those familiar with Egypt know that hardly a day passes from March to September when landings in this direction are possible due to the prevailing winds and sea waves. One of the factors that contributed to the failure of this campaign was the commanders' choice of a completely inopportune time to launch the campaign and land in Alexandria, which is exposed during this period to rain storms and strong winds, reaching speeds of 53 to 61 kilometers per hour. It is known that several sea storms are active during March, including: the Salloum storm: This storm occurs in early March and lasts for only two days. It is named after the westerly winds blowing from the direction of Salloum in Matrouh Governorate. On the eighth day, the Hasum storm begins and lasts for six days. It is northwesterly to northeasterly, sometimes rainy, and is characterized by intense lightning, thunder, and rainfall. It is considered the last of the intense rain storms. On the fourteenth,

there is the Baqee al-Hasoum wind, which lasts for two days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. On the twenty-second, there is the Shams al-Kabira wind, which lasts for three days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. On the twenty-ninth, there is the Awwa and Bard al-Ajouz wind, which lasts for three days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy. It is considered the last of the cold winds, and the reason for naming it this name is because of the sounds of the winds, especially at night, and because its duration is unknown. On the second of April, there is the Baqee al-Awwa wind, which lasts for two days and is northwesterly and sometimes rainy.

The Khamasin winds are so named because they become active fifty days after the arrival of spring, that is, in April. They are dry, hot, seasonal southeasterly winds that come from the Sahara Desert. They arise from air depressions that sweep eastward across the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea or North Africa from February to June. This is due to the drop in atmospheric pressure in the Sahara Desert and North Africa, and the rise in temperature compared to the Mediterranean Sea, which becomes cold after winter. This leads to the propagation of hot, dusty winds laden with thousands of tons of sand, dust, and dirt towards Egypt, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. Their temperature reaches approximately 40 degrees Celsius, but it drops by approximately 15 degrees Celsius near the northern coast upon the arrival of a cold front heading towards these hot winds coming from the northwest. These winds are very fast, reaching speeds of up to 140 km/h, leading to a rapid rise in temperatures. They lead to a rapid rise in temperatures, a drop in visibility, eye inflammation, and spring conjunctivitis [39].

Therefore, the best informed were the most alarmed at the sight of all the reinforcements and supplies that allowed or depended on negative elements. Water had to be obtained, but at some distance to our rear, and it was neither good nor plentiful. Under these unfavorable conditions, it was impossible to foresee the extent of our misfortunes, and depended only on the Turkish frigates to complete them, by intercepting the ships. After various attempts, some man-boats laden with supplies were pushed through the waves. But it was too dangerous to launch landings. It was therefore determined to send them towards the Ajami Fort, where it was hoped the surf would be less violent.

Indeed, they had good reason to be proud of their conduct. For three weeks, they were subjected to every conceivable hardship and many extreme disturbances: they lay uncovered, enduring the scorching sun during the day and at night the north winds and nitrous

exhalations, which contained a large proportion of nitrogen. As far as breathing is concerned, nitrous oxide is the main source of air pollution. Expiration, the process of exhaling air, is an inevitable consequence of inhalation, but in urgent situations, the abdominal muscles intervene to constrict the rib cage, increasing the pressure within the lungs and forcing air out of the body through the airways [40].

The situation worsened with the blowing of winds, carrying with them all the sand, insects, and other pests that accompany this scourge. This is especially true since the northern lakes, including Lake Edku, are a breeding ground for mosquitoes. The Khamasin winds contributed to the rampage of these insects, which fiercely attacked the British army. Strangely, Alexander Mackenzie Fraser, the commander of the British campaign in Egypt after his defeat at Rosetta in 1807, commanded the First Infantry Division, which was scheduled to be sent to aid Sweden during the Russo-Swedish War of 1808. During the Peninsular War, Fraser commanded the Third Infantry Division in Portugal and Spain during 1808-1809, participating in the Battle of Corunna. He then commanded another division during the Walcheren Campaign of 1809, but died there from a disease he contracted, known at the time as "Walcheren Fever," a combination of malaria and typhus.

In a letter from Ibrahim Bey, the sheikh of the town, to Major General Fraser, dated 5 Rabi' al-Thani 1222 [30], (June 12, 1807), he asks to be informed of the date of the army's<sup>1</sup> movement towards Cairo, whether in the last ten days of the Khamasin.

He also mentioned that news of the Pasha's success in Upper Egypt reached Cairo at a time when the country was reeling from the announcement of the occupation of Alexandria. The governor met with the emirs<sup>2</sup> [1] near Asyut<sup>3</sup> on a day<sup>4</sup> [41], [42] during the Khamasin period, when the air was filled with thick dust.

Captain Hallowell's letter to Admiral Sir Thomas Lewis [30], of the Tiger, in Alexandria's

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<sup>1</sup> Portfolio No. (Ad. 1-413).

<sup>2</sup> Drovetti to Sébastiani, March 28, 1807.

<sup>3</sup> Mangin made the scene of the movement in Manqabad.

<sup>4</sup> Mangin scheduled this event for April 2.

However, al-Jabarti declares that the news of Mohamed Ali's success was known in Cairo on Wednesday, 15 Muharram (March 15, 1807);

On the other hand, Drovetti alludes to it in a letter to Sébastiani dated March 28, 1807. The action likely took place between March 20 and 25.

western harbour, April 29, 1807<sup>1</sup>, states: The khamasin blew during the day, which overtaxed the troops, and the sailors pulling the guns were much worn out; and a man belonging to the Apollo died the same night from excessive fatigue.

In a letter from Captain Hallowell to Admiral Sir Thomas Lewis, from HMS Tiger, in Alexandria's western harbor, on April 29, 1807, he mentioned that Major Messitt, the British Consul, had reported that the army had marched from Khan al-Tariq towards Rosetta. However, something unexpected had happened: the Khamasin winds blew during the day, exhausting the troops beyond recognition. The British commanders' ignorance of the Egyptian climate was proven. They arrived during March and April, a month filled with heavy rains, bitter cold, and high sea levels. These conditions had a profound impact on the troops, both on Lake Mariout when the expedition landed and on Lake Edku after the withdrawal from Rosetta following the second defeat. The increased nitrogen content in the air caused the soldiers to feel lethargic, shiver, and experience shortness of breath. They were also unaware that April was the period during which the hot, dusty Khamasin winds sweep across the country, causing conjunctivitis among the soldiers. The situation worsened with the blowing of winds, bringing with them all the sand, insects, and other pests that accompany this calamity.

This is especially true since the northern lakes, including Lake Edku, are a breeding ground for mosquitoes. The khamasin winds contributed to the rampage of these insects, which attacked the British army with ferocity. His lack of experience with Egypt's climate and the campaign's occurrence during the khamasin winds, which caused widespread conjunctivitis and vernal conjunctivitis among the troops, affecting almost all of them, were evident in his complete reliance on reckless commanders who lacked military experience. The best evidence of this is that, upon the troops' arrival in Rosetta, the officers abandoned their duties and went to dinner at the home of Petrucci, the British consul, located on the outskirts of the city. Meanwhile, the soldiers sat quietly in groups of eight or ten in shops and cafes, morbidly assuming that the city had surrendered to them.

### **3. The British Army's Reaction to the Huge Defeat**

We review below the British Army's reaction to the Huge Defeat through their exchanged letters at that time. Fraser sent a letter on April 16, 1807 [1], stating: "This campaign has

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<sup>1</sup> Wallet No. (Ad. 1-413)

failed. Our soldiers occupied the Abu Mandour hills, which overlook the city, without loss. However, instead of maintaining this position, the General entered the city with his entire army. The enemy then brutally attacked the soldiers from windows and rooftops, without the soldiers even seeing them. Therefore, they thought of withdrawing, especially after General Wycob was killed and Brigadier General Mead was seriously wounded. Our soldiers returned to Abu Qir, dead and wounded, and returned to Alexandria. I expected that any resistance, if it had occurred, would have been insignificant. The reason for our defeat was the unfortunate plan that allowed the soldiers to enter the city without exploring it.

"Thus, the brave men were placed before the force of the enemy, which was very dangerous. When I found that famine would be an inevitable and immediate consequence of our remaining in Alexandria without occupying Rosetta, besides the negative impression that would be made in the minds of the Arabs and supporters of our interests in the country, and also because this would affect the honor of the British name, I sent, in agreement and consultation with Thomas Lewis, Commander of the Fleet since the departure of Decourth, another corps under the command of Brigadier General Stewart and Colonel Oswald to accomplish this objective, without which the occupation of Alexandria could not be achieved and which determined our fate in this country. I request - if the decision is to continue - the immediate dispatch of reinforcements and the closure of the port of Damietta to prevent the flow of milk. Let it be clearly understood that although I have the motive to achieve success at Rosetta, if unforeseen difficulties arise which could cause a second failure, I see no other option but to withdraw."

The Battle of Rosetta had a profound impact on the development of the situation, as this clear victory filled the hearts of the Egyptians with enthusiasm and pride, and weakened the prestige the English had in the hearts of the people, a prestige that stemmed from their previous victories over the French army in Egypt and over the French fleets overseas. It was no surprise that this victory instilled a spirit of confidence in the people and encouraged them to continue their resistance. This incident had a profound impact on the Mamluks, as it was a severe shock to them, weakening their hope of the success of the English campaign and causing them to withdraw into their strongholds in Upper Egypt. Consequently, the English army did not expect the support it had been expecting from them. All these considerations made the Battle of Rosetta an important matter of great value and danger.

After the battle, Ali Bey, the ruler of Rosetta, took the initiative to send the English prisoners

to Cairo, along with the heads of their dead, as a declaration of Rosetta's victory, and to instill in the soldiers and the people a spirit of hope and confidence.

Al-Jabarti said in his description, summarizing: "On Sunday, the 26th of Muharram 1222 (April 1807), rumors spread of the arrival of the heads of the slain and their captives to Bulaq. People rushed to go and see them, and many of them reached the shore of Bulaq. The senior soldiers also rode with their groups to meet them, so they took them to the shore, accompanied by a group of soldiers. They brought them from outside Egypt and entered through Bab al-Nasr. They led them through the center of the city, and among them were a senior officer and another elderly man, both riding on donkeys. The rest were on foot in the middle of the soldiers, and the heads of the slain were with them on camels, numbering fourteen heads, and the living were twenty-five.

They continued to march with them to the Azbakeya Lake, and upon their arrival, they fired cannons and rifles, and they took the living with their men to the citadel. On Monday, a number of heads and captives also arrived in Bulaq, and they took them out in the aforementioned manner, numbering one hundred and twenty-one heads, thirteen captives, and among them were wounded." We have spoken about the share of the people of Rosetta in the battle that took place in its streets and the defeat that befell the British army. The people of Cairo showed the same spirit that was evident in the people of Rosetta. As soon as news of the first battle arrived, the sheikhs, led by Sayyid Omar Makram, called on the people of Cairo to volunteer to fight.

The imams of the mosques delivered sermons urging the people to jihad, and they responded willingly to the call and volunteered willingly. Every morning, the volunteers went to the outskirts of the city to dig trenches and build fortifications north of Cairo to repel the British if they came by the Shubra road. They rushed to work and hastened to prepare for battle. The poor volunteered for half the day and then returned to their livelihoods at noon.

The capital displayed the same spirit that was evident before the Battle of the Pyramids (1897) and during the people's revolution against Khurshid Pasha (1805). In this regard, Monsieur Mangin described what he witnessed: "Mr. Omar Makram would go every morning, followed by crowds, to where the workers were working on building the fortifications.

He would often stay there all day in a tent prepared for him. His presence would inspire enthusiasm and courage in the hearts of all the people, and everyone did what they could to

build the fortifications." Al-Jabarti described Omar Makram's work: "On the 26th of Muharram, Mr. Omar al-Naqib alerted the people and ordered them to carry weapons and prepare for jihad against the English, even to the vicinity of al-Azhar. He ordered them to refrain from attending lessons, and he also ordered the teaching sheikhs not to give lessons." The call for jihad that Mr. Omar Makram spread and the spirit that he breathed into the ranks of the people was similar to his position when he called on the people to volunteer to fight the French before the Battle of the Pyramids.

Then, consider his call to Al-Azhar students to participate in the fighting. You will find that he did not view them only as men of knowledge and religion, but also as men of jihad, fighting, and defending honor. Their work in that era was more comprehensive and greater than their work today.

Al-Jabarti said in another place, describing the meeting of the people's leaders and government officials to consult on what should be done: "On Tuesday, the Beit al-Qadi meeting was held, and Hassan Pasha, Omar Bey, the Defterdar, Katkhuda Bey, Sayyid Omar al-Naqib, Sheikh al-Sharqawi, Sheikh al-Amir, and the rest of the sheikhs were present. They spoke about the incident with the British and preparing to fight them, kill them, and expel them, as they are enemies of religion and faith. The people and the army must be in a state of harmony, compassion, and unity, and the soldiers must refrain from harming the people, as is their custom, and they must help each other to repel the enemy. Then they consulted about fortifying the city and digging trenches. Some of them said that the British only come from the western bank, and the Nile is a barrier between the two sides. They said that the French were more knowledgeable about wars, and that they had only dug the trench connecting Bab al-Hadid to the sea (the Nile), so attention should be paid to repairing it, even if it was not as elaborate and perfect as theirs. They agreed on that."

He said elsewhere: "On Wednesday, the 29th of Muharram, Sayyid Umar al-Naqib, the judge, and the aforementioned notables set out and descended to the Bulaq region to arrange the aforementioned trench. They were accompanied by the French consul, who had advised them to do so. They were also accompanied by a large crowd of people and followers, all armed."

He said about the participation of various classes in digging the aforementioned trench and erecting fortifications, to the best of their ability: "They began digging the aforementioned trench and distributed the work to the wealthy, the agents and inns, the merchants, the

craftsmen, and the diggers. They assigned some the wages of one hundred laborers and others the wages of twenty-five. The same also applied to the people of Bulaq, the Christians of the Customs Department, the Christians, the Greeks, the Levantines, and the Copts. They purchased cutters, slugs, picks, picks, and digging tools, and began building a circular wall at the foot of the hill of the Sabtiyya Citadel."

All these preparations took place while Mohamed Ali Pasha was still absent in Upper Egypt. This indicates that the people were volunteering of their own accord to fight, determined to wage war and resist, as was the case with the arrival of the French campaign. The French consul referred to by al-Jabarti was Monsieur Drovetti, who was in Alexandria when the British arrived. He left the port for fear of being captured by the British, given the entrenched hostility between England and France at the time. He left Alexandria for Rosetta, from where he went to Cairo, where he participated in organizing its defense.

The volunteering of the people of Cairo was not limited to defending the capital, but they also rushed to the aid of their brothers, the people of Rosetta. Although they repelled the first British army, they were targeted by the advance of the second British army, which came to erase the effects of the first incident. Rosetta was besieged, and cannons were mounted on the hills of Abu Mandour, which it controlled. It began to bombard them with cannons in preparation for an attack and a forced conquest.

Many of its houses were destroyed and many of its people died from the bombs and cannon fire. Sayyid Hassan Krit, the captain of the Rosetta nobles, sent letters to Sayyid Omar Makram, asking for help and requesting that he supply the city with men and equipment. Sayyid Omar read the first letter to the people and encouraged them to volunteer to aid Rosetta. They responded, volunteered, carried weapons, and decided to travel to aid their brothers. Although Katkhuda Bey did not allow them to travel until Mohamed Ali Pasha arrived from Upper Egypt, many of them did not care about this prohibition and traveled to aid the people of Rosetta in repelling the British army. The people of Buhaira and the surrounding areas also volunteered to defend Rosetta. This was a clear manifestation of national solidarity, sharing in the burden of jihad, uniting in the face of danger, and sacrificing every place in the country with every individual from the country.

Al-Jabarti said: "On Thursday, the last of Muharram, a letter arrived from Sayyid Hassan Krit, the chief of the Rosettaite nobles, and the one referred to by it (i.e., its chief aide), stating that when the British had defeated Rosetta and returned to Alexandria in defeat, they

prepared and arrived in the El-Hammad area south of Rosetta, with formidable cannons and equipment, and they set up their barricades from the seashore (the Nile) to the mountain, across the night of Tuesday, the twenty-eighth.

This is what happened, we have informed you of, and we hope for assistance and reinforcements with men, cavalry, equipment, and equipment, and not to be slow and neglectful. When this reply arrived, Sayyid Umar, the chief, read it to the people and urged them to prepare and go out for jihad. They complied and put on their weapons. He gathered together a group of Moroccans, Turks from Khan el-Khalili, and many from the Adawiya and Asyutiya, and the people of the town. He rode out in the morning to he rode to Katkhuda Bey and asked his permission to go, but he refused and said, “Until our Pasha (Mohamed Ali) comes and sees what he thinks about it.”

He said in another place: “On Saturday, the second of Safar (April 11, 1807), a letter also arrived from the port of Rosetta, signed by Ali Bey al-Salankli, the governor of the port, Tahir Pasha, and Ahmed Agha, known as Bonaparte, meaning the letter of the previous Sayyid Hassan, in which they mentioned that the English had also taken possession of Kom al-Afrah and Abu Mandhur and were urging aid.

On the fifth of Safar, a letter arrived from Rosetta, signed by Sayyid Hassan Krit, in which he informed us that the English were surrounding the port and surrounding it, and were bombarding the town with cannons and bombs. Many houses and buildings had been destroyed, and many people had died. We had sent to you before that date, asking for aid and assistance, but you did not help us by sending anything. We did not know why this situation was, or what this neglect was. So, God help us, for the noose has tightened and hearts have reached throats from anticipation of misfortune, and from constant vigilance and staying up late at the barricades, and such talk. It is a letter to Sayyid Omar al-Naqib and the sheikhs, and it is dated On the second of Safar 1222.

The Battle of Rosetta was a severe blow to the British army. General Fraser, seeking to erase the effects of the defeat he had suffered in that incident, intended to dispatch another army to resume the advance on Rosetta, entrusting its command to General Stewart.

Meanwhile, Mohamed Ali Pasha arrived in Cairo, returning from Upper Egypt, on the night of April 12, 1807 (Safar 3, 1222). He learned of the news of the English defeat at Rosetta, and was reassured. He found the situation less dangerous than he had expected. However, he did not rely on what had happened in that battle, and with his keen insight saw that the

English might resume fighting and advancing to regain their lost prestige. He hastened to dispatch an army to fight them and prevent them from advancing.

He completed the fortifications he had begun before his arrival, and continued digging trenches between Bab al-Hadid and Bulaq to establish a defensive line for Cairo from the north. He also dug ditches in front of the trenches that connected to the Nile to fill with water and hinder the advance of the English army. He sank several ships between Bulaq Island and the coast to prevent the passage of English ships on the Nile, and set up batteries of cannons in Shubra, Imbaba, and Bulaq Island. The scholars and the people participated in the work with enthusiasm and zeal. He began to arrange the necessary funds for the army's expenses, and was assisted by Sayyid Umar Makram and the scholars in gathering as much money as possible. They collected nine hundred purses from the capital's residents, allocating them for the expenses of the march. The expedition, consisting of four thousand infantry and five hundred and one thousand cavalry, was equipped and marched to Rosetta under the command of Tabuz Oghli. Stuart's army, meanwhile, numbered approximately four thousand fighters equipped with cannons and weapons. This army moved from Alexandria on April 3, advancing on Rosetta. When it was close to Rosetta, General Stuart dispatched a battalion to occupy El-Hammad, located south of Rosetta between the Nile and Lake Edku. The purpose of occupying it was to encircle Rosetta, prevent reinforcements from reaching it from the south, and protect the British army. The British forces reached Rosetta, where they surrounded the city and bombarded the city with cannons and bombs. Many houses and buildings were destroyed and many people died. The British had occupied the village of Al-Hammad Qibli Rosetta, with huge cannons and equipment. They set up their barricades from the seashore to the mountain, and took possession of Kom Al-Afrah and Abu Mandour [27]. When the English advanced towards the Alexandria Gate and placed a mortar and some rifles, the Albanians shouted loudly across the walls and fired incessantly from their rifles through the countless holes and cracks. The English placed two (12) inch double mortars, a (6) inch light gun and a (23) pound carronade opposite the Alexandria [1] Gate on April 10. Then the people placed two cannons on the eastern bank of the Nile and began throwing their bombs at the right flank of the English on the western bank. Then Major MacDonald decided to cross the river at Abu Mandour Mosque (on April 16) at the head of a force of (250) soldiers and took control of the Egyptian position and their cannons, but when they received reinforcements, MacDonald returned again to the western bank and continued to

attack Rosetta and tighten the siege until reinforcements arrived from Cairo [26], The British also occupied the Abu Mandour hills and mounted cannons on them to bombard Rosetta. Most of the army camped west and south of Rosetta and began to besiege it (April 7) and bombard it with cannons.

The English thought that bombarding the city with cannons would strike terror into the hearts of the garrison and the people, and force them to surrender. They had warned them more than once to surrender the city, but they refused. Their previous victory in the Battle of Rosetta had instilled in them zeal and enthusiasm, so they were determined to defend their city valiantly. Despite the destruction of homes and the killing of a large number of residents caused by the bombs, they were patient and endured these hardships with courage and composure. They would leave the city from time to time to skirmish with the English forces. The siege continued for about twelve days without the English achieving any significant victory. “What you have informed me of regarding the approaching Mamluks has made me hesitate to attack Rosetta. We have inflicted great damage on the city and we have fired (300) bombs from long-range cannons at it.

However, it has become clear to us that the enemy does not care about the calamities that befall them. Their forces do not exceed, as we have learned, (300) cavalry, (800) Albanians and a thousand armed locals. However, given the breadth of their defense lines and the nature of their positions, I did not see it wise to rush to storm the city. Our success depends on the rescue of the Mamluks. If they come to us, we can send a force to the eastern bank of the Nile to participate in the fighting. Now, this is impossible for us because the enemy is superior to us in cavalry strength, and we do not have such a force that has a great impact in the flat areas such as the Delta. While awaiting that rescue, it becomes clear to us how important our position in El-Hammad. We expect the enemy to attack us. In it, and we will do our best to keep it in our hands.”

The English were waiting for the Mamluks to come to their aid, but the Mamluks began to procrastinate and delay fulfilling their promise, and to watch the developments, and then abandoned their allies when they saw the precariousness of their position. Meanwhile, the locals began to attack the English positions in El-Hammad, so General Stuart sent reinforcements of soldiers to them. The Egyptians also mounted two cannons on the eastern bank and began to throw bombs at the right flank of the English army on the western bank. Major MacDonald crossed the river at the Abu Mandour Mosque (April 16) with a force of

(250) soldiers and seized the Egyptian position and the two cannons. Then the Egyptians received reinforcements, so MacDonald returned to the western bank. The attacks and siege continued until the reinforcements sent by Mohamed Ali Pasha arrived under the command of Tabuz Oghli, and the military situation changed fundamentally. This reinforcement was composed of two divisions, the first led by Tabu Oghli himself on the eastern bank of the Nile, and the other led by Hassan Pasha on the western bank. The two divisions were moving in line with each other on both banks. When they arrived near Rosetta, Hassan Pasha's division camped opposite El-Hammad [13] and the other camped in Barnabal on the eastern bank. The soldiers of the two divisions were watching each other, in addition to the city's forces consisting of (300) horsemen, (800) Albanians and (1500) locals [1], [13].

On the morning of April 20, the vanguard of the Egyptian forces advanced, consisting of cavalry from Hassan Pasha's division, toward the British positions at El-Hammad. They encountered a battalion of his in the middle of the farms. The British attempted to retreat to the village, but they failed to complete their withdrawal. Egyptian cavalry surrounded them, killing some and capturing others. When General Stewart learned of this initial encounter, he dispatched Colonel Macleod, along with a number of soldiers and artillery, to El-Hammad to consolidate the British position there. He entrusted him with command of the force stationed there. The location of this village was of great importance, and the axis of the fighting revolved around it. It was located on the isthmus between the Nile and Lake Edku. To its north lay a canal, which was then dry and connected the Nile to the lake. Had the British defended their position there, they could have blocked the Egyptian army's path, preventing it from crossing the isthmus or reaching Rosetta to provide aid.

The Colonel arranged the positions of his soldiers to defend this isthmus. Their number was eight hundred fighters, with their left flank facing the Nile under the command of Major Wigsland; their right flank near Lake Edku under the command of Captain Tarleton; and their center at the village of El-Hammad under the command of Major Moore. The British army was stationed around Rosetta to besiege it. April 20 passed, and the British position at El-Hammad was apparently not threatened. Colonel Macleod was confident in his position. However, General Stewart noticed that the defensive line at El-Hammad (on the night of April 21) could not withstand pressure from the Egyptian army in some areas if their numbers increased. He instructed Colonel Macleod to defend his positions as valiantly as he could. In the event of an increase in Egyptian cavalry forces, he should retreat to the lake

shore. If this was not possible, he should retreat to the positions of the British army besieging Rosetta.

General Stewart realized that the Egyptian forces, after receiving reinforcements, were now more numerous than the British army. He decided to wait until the following day (April 21). He resolved that if no aid from the Mamluks arrived, he would withdraw from El-Hammad, lift the siege of Rosetta, and retreat to Alexandria.

Tabu Oghli, the commander of the Egyptian army, was hesitant about which route to take: whether to go directly to aid Rosetta and lift the siege, or first attack the British position at El-Hammad. Encouraged by the victory achieved by Hassan Pasha's cavalry on the West Bank in the first clash, he decided to follow the latter plan. He crossed the Nile at night with his soldiers, and boats transported them to the left bank.

They joined Hassan Pasha's division in preparation for an attack on El-Hammad on the morning of April 21. In the morning, Colonel Macleod saw that the Egyptian army forces had increased in number and that the plain was filled with their men. He immediately sent to General Stewart informing him of the news and asking him to approve his withdrawal to the British army positions around Rosetta. Stewart sent him to approve his plan and to provide him with a detachment of soldiers. However, the messenger did not reach El-Hammad and neither did the reinforcements arrive because the Egyptian army cavalry had cut off communications between El-Hammad and Rosetta.

Macleod intended to withdraw from his defensive line, but he did not master his plan and his forces were scattered. The Egyptian army cavalry were able to attack them one by one while the Egyptian infantry occupied the village of El-Hammad. The incident began at seven in the morning and continued for three hours during which the fighting was intense. The cavalry pursued the three forces, surrounding the center force, which included Colonel Macleod. They were showered with bullets from every direction, killing most of its men, including Colonel Macleod himself. They also surrounded the right flank, killing its commander, Trilton, and most of its soldiers. Only fifty escaped death and were taken prisoner.

As for the left flank, it resisted a little and was surrounded by cavalry from every side. Its commander, Major Vogelsand, saw no alternative but to surrender. He and the remaining British surrendered, and that was the end of the battle, which ended with the defeat of the British army stationed in Al-Hammad. No one escaped from it. Those who were not killed

did not escape capture. Their losses amounted to about (416) dead and (400) prisoners. In Captain de Lans' report on April 20, he stated: "Reinforcements of (100) soldiers were sent, and a surprise occurred when boats came across the Nile with forces that the English had not noticed. In the morning, they discovered about 100 boats half a mile away, and two large boats with square sails, each with four or five cannons. The presence of these boats prevented the English forces from passing. Colonel Macleod was forced to withdraw his artillery and forces to a sandy hill three-quarters of a mile away. The Egyptians exploited a gap in our forces and took control of the village. Colonel Macleod found himself surrounded by the cavalry, which had turned across the plain on the right, numbering (500), forming three groups on the right. All the infantry forces arrived, taking cover behind the heights and trees, and they continued to fire very heavily. This reduced our forces greatly in terms of dead and wounded. After the enemy had destroyed the battalion on the heights, they advanced to attack, where Major Voglang's position sent the flag of surrender." Then the cavalry rushed forward and captured everyone except those who continued firing, neither trusting nor relying on the enemy's mercy [1]".

Tabouz Oglu was stationed in Barnabal and joined Hassan Pasha's forces in preparation for confronting Al-Hammad on (21) April. The battle of Al-Hammad was decisive and began at seven o'clock in the morning and continued for three hours, ending with the defeat of the English. No one from their forces in Al-Hammad escaped, and those who were not killed were taken prisoner [26].

During the incident, General Stewart was stationed south of Rosetta with the rest of the British army. When he realized the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen his forces in El-Hammad, he quickly lifted the siege of Rosetta and withdrew before the Egyptian army could attack him. He destroyed his cannons, which he could not carry, and retreated to the Abu Qir road, dragging his tails of disappointment and defeat. Despite his concealment of the withdrawal plans, the people of Rosetta and the neighboring towns pursued him in his withdrawal until he reached Lake Edku. Skirmishes took place on the lake shore between him and the Egyptians, which ended with the latter retreating. The British continued their withdrawal until they reached Abu Qir, from where they boarded ships for Alexandria. Al-Jabarti said about the Battle of Al-Hammad the following: "On Thursday, the 14th of Safar, two messengers came and informed us of the victory over the English and their defeat. A large crowd of people from Buhaira and other areas, the people of Rosetta and those with

them from the volunteers and soldiers, and the people of Damanhur, had gathered. It happened that Katkhuda Bey and Ismail Kashf Al-Tobji had arrived in that area, and there was a great slaughter between the two sides. They captured a group of the English and cut off several heads from them.

The Pasha (Mohamed Ali) put two coats of mail on the messengers. After that, two Turks also arrived with correspondence verifying that news, and they exaggerated the news and that the English had withdrawn from the barricades of Rosetta, Abu Mandour, and Al-Hammad. The fighters from the villages continued behind them until they reached the middle of the desert and captured their cavalry, weapons, cannons, and two large mortars.”

He said in another place describing the Egyptians’ volunteering to fight after the First Battle of Rosetta and their share in the Battle of Al-Hammad and the good deeds they performed there, and how their right was denied after that and their merit in jihad and victory was not recognized: “Likewise, the people of the country strengthened their resolve and prepared to emerge and fight, and they bought weapons and called upon each other to jihad, and the volunteers increased and they set up banners and flags for themselves, and they collected dirhams from each other and spent on those who joined them from the poor, and they went out in processions and drums and trumpets, and when they reached the English barricades, they attacked them from every side contrary to the laws of their wars and their order, and they were honest in their attack on them, and they threw themselves into the fires and did not care about their shooting, and they attacked them and mingled with them, and they astonished them with the takbir and the morning until they nullified their shooting and their fire, so they threw down their weapons, and asked for safety but they did not pay attention to that, and they captured them and slaughtered many of them and brought with them the prisoners and heads in the manner mentioned and the rest fled to Whoever remained in Alexandria, I wish the common people had thanked them for that or attributed any credit to them.

Rather, all of that was attributed to the Pasha and his soldiers, and the common people were rewarded with the opposite reward after that.” The English army suffered a crushing defeat and Major Vogelsang's soldiers were surprised to see him running with a handkerchief in his hand, embracing the person carrying the truce flag. Captain de Lans adds: "We were immediately detained and forced, one by one, to raise our hands and thank God, who is able to soften the hard heart, as they continued to treat us from that time on in an acceptable

manner in the usual custom of prisoners of war and sometimes in some cases better.

On the night of April 28, all the prisoners settled in tents and boats on the other side of the Nile opposite the village of El-Hammad. The next morning, they advanced in small groups towards this place and the greater part was transported by river, but the group I was in traveled all the way by land, a distance of between (130) and (140) miles, which we completed in four and a half days. We were allowed to stay in quarters prepared for our accommodation and the sick were housed in places under medical supervision. We were also allowed a quantity of bread, water and money at a successive rate every day (15) bars for the officer, (10) bars for the sergeant, (8) bars for the lieutenant, and (5) bars for the soldier [1].”

.The Battle of El-Hammad was a crushing defeat for the British, filling the hearts of the Egyptians with determination and pride, and shattering the prestige of the British army, especially when their prisoners were gathered and shipped to Cairo, so that people could realize the great victory achieved by the Egyptian army. These prisoners arrived in Bulaq on the 2nd of Safar 1222 (April 29, 1807). They were taken from Bulaq to Azbakeya and from there to the Citadel, numbering (480) prisoners, led by the British army commanders Major Moore and Major Vogelsand. The day of their arrival was a memorable one, as crowds thronged the streets and roads to see the sight of the prisoners. The heads of the British dead were paraded for people to see, in the manner that was common at that time, and their number reached (450).

General Fraser, however, was discouraged after the defeats of Rosetta and Al-Hammad and saw it was futile to resume the fighting. He refrained from going to Alexandria and began to fortify it. He sent messengers to the Mamluk leaders reminding them of Al-Alfi’s promises, urging them to keep their promises and urging them to support and assist him so that he could continue the fight and return them to the rule of law. However, when the Mamluks learned of the defeat that had befallen the English, they turned a deaf ear to General Fraser’s request and remained far from the thick of the fighting. In order to secure himself, Fraser, during the withdrawal, destroyed the Abu Qir Dam to prevent them from reaching the Egyptian army, and for the waters of Lake Abu Qir to overflow into Mariout and for the waters to surround Alexandria from all sides. This was the second time that the British cut this dam. The first time was (1801) when they fought General Menou and wanted to confine him in Alexandria, so they cut the dam. The sea waters flowed and flooded (140) villages around Abu Qir until the waters reached the outskirts of Damanhur, destroying crops and

livestock and ruining homes [24]. It is no secret that cutting the dam damages the Alexandria Canal, preventing its waters from reaching the border and destroying many countries in the Mariout region. The British caused this destruction twice.

In fact, England at that time resolved to abandon the invasion of Egypt. This was not out of scruple or a refusal to realize its colonial ambitions in the Nile Valley, but rather because the political situation in Europe made it impossible for it to continue its campaign against Egypt. The conflict between it and Bonaparte had reached its peak, and Bonaparte was at the height of his power and glory. Most of the European continent had submitted to him, and he had concluded the famous Treaty of Tilsit with the Tsar of Russia. This peace consolidated his position in Europe and secured the Tsar's friendship.

He was thus able to devote himself to directing his forces to crush England. England decided to gather its forces to defend its island and preferred not to risk its armies on distant campaigns when it needed them. On the other hand, after the defeat and disappointment of its soldiers at Rosetta and Hammad, it saw that the campaign against Egypt was not likely to yield any desirable results. For this reason, it abandoned the campaign and sent a summons for its army, ordering General Fraser to depart with his soldiers for Sicily.

This does not mean that she abandoned her ambitions in Egypt, but rather she saw that she should postpone achieving them until another opportunity arose. She continued to harbour evil for Egypt and watch for opportunities until she showed her fangs during the intensification of the conflict between Egypt and Turkey (1839). She intervened in the Egyptian issue, incited the European countries against Egypt and deprived it of the fruits of its victories over the Turks, as will be explained. After that, she continued to watch for opportunities to occupy the country until the opportunity arose (1882) during the Urabi Revolution.

After the French consul's position on the campaign was clear, and he was the one who was urging the commander of Alexandria and Mohamed Ali to quickly fortify the city against the British army, we find him, after the campaign, extending a helping hand in order to release the prisoners. Fraser even sent a letter to his command (on May 14) in which he expressed his gratitude to the French consul for his humanity and concern. There were many officers and soldiers who were captured by the people, and these were considered slaves and did not fall under the description of prisoners of war. They were ransomed and released after the mediation of the French consul [1]. The total number of prisoners after the end of the

campaign was (515) between officers and soldiers.

Mohamed Ali began preparing to march on Alexandria and expel the British. He marched with his army from his camp in Imbaba to Rahmania, and from there to Damanhur on 7 Jumada al-Thani 1222 (August 12, 1807). His army consisted of three thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, equipped with powerful artillery. The British had held out in Alexandria and began fortifying it after their defeats at Rosetta and Al-Hammad. No sooner had he begun to implement his intention than a messenger from General Fraser came to him in Cairo carrying a letter from him. He thought that this letter was about the English prisoners in the citadel, so he opened it and found in it General Fraser's request to negotiate a peace agreement on the condition that the army withdraw from Alexandria. Mohamed Ali did not expect to withdraw from the country so easily, as they had been looking forward for several years to occupy it and extend their influence over it and were making efforts and means to achieve their ambitions in it.

Mohamed Ali did not miss what the English had done since the French campaign to occupy Egypt, nor their efforts with the Sublime Porte and their continuous intrigues to appoint their Mamluk clients to rule the country, especially Mohamed Bey al-Alfi, nor their deployment of that campaign for this purpose. All of this did not escape Mohamed Ali's attention, and therefore he hardly believed this letter. He replied to the messenger that he was going with his army to Damanhur, and there he would send his answer to General Fraser.

The negotiations continued until the Egyptian and British sides agreed on the articles of the treaty concluded in Damanhur on September 14, 1807, between Mohamed Ali, the governor of Egypt, General Shoebrook, and Captain Fellowes. When he reached Damanhur, he met with the English General Shoebrook, who was authorized by General Fraser to agree on a peace agreement. There, the two parties concluded the treaty, which stipulated the evacuation of the British soldiers from Alexandria in exchange for the return of their prisoners and wounded. Mohamed Ali immediately sent his order to Cairo to carry the British prisoners immediately, and General Fraser began preparing the evacuation equipment and receiving the prisoners. On September 19, the British evacuated the city, and Tabuz Oghli took over Alexandria on behalf of Mohamed Ali. Then the British ship set sail with the expedition's soldiers to Sicily. Al-Jabarti said: "On Wednesday, Rajab 13, 1222, the heralds of the British landing in Alexandria reached the ships. Katkhuda Bey (Tabuz Oghli) entered and stayed at the home of Sheikh Al-Masiri. Thus, the second British occupation,

which lasted six months, was closed."

For the previous seven years, Alexandria had been isolated from the rest of Egypt, far from the influence of Mohamed Ali. The Sublime Porte considered it directly subordinate to its rule, and the governors had no influence there. It remained this way until the British withdrew from the country and Mohamed Ali marched there. This evacuation was a happy opportunity to extend the influence of the Egyptian government throughout its lands. Mohamed Ali entered the city for the first time after the British withdrawal. It was a memorable day, when the cannons of the castles and towers were fired in celebration of the liberation of Alexandria. These are the provisions of the treaty [26]:

1. The fighting between the two parties shall cease immediately upon the commencement of negotiations. The English commanders shall evacuate Alexandria and leave the forts, barricades, cannons, and equipment in their original condition within ten days of the signing of this treaty. The governor shall provide his son-in-law Mustafa Bey, his uncle Ishaq Bey, and his heir apparent Suleiman Effendi to be on an English ship as hostages until these conditions are fulfilled.
2. Complete freedom shall be granted to the English prisoners in Egypt. After the governor has completely taken control of Alexandria, the prisoners shall be sent to the port at the end of the Nile (Rosetta). After their disembarkation on the English ship, the hostages shall be released.
3. The civilian population of Alexandria shall be granted amnesty and their lives and property shall be guaranteed.
4. Amin Bey al-Alfi al-Masri, who had sailed from Alexandria during the British presence there, and his twelve men shall be safe in their lives and property upon their return. They shall be sent to the place where they wish to reside, protected and safeguarded from attack.
5. Nearby prisoners were to be handed over immediately. Since it was not possible to hand over distant prisoners immediately, after the governor took control of Alexandria, an English representative remained there to receive all those present, with the governor's permission to deport the prisoners he received on an English ship, or as he saw fit, to send them to Sicily and Malta on Rajab 11, 1224 AH (September 14, 1807).

Mohamed Ali remained in Alexandria until he left and traveled overland to Rosetta, accompanied by Hassan Pasha. From there, he descended the Nile to Cairo. On his way there, his boat capsized in front of Wardan, so he swam across the river and continued his

journey mounted on his horse. Unusually, his horse slipped and he fell to the ground. The Pasha's entourage was alarmed by both incidents. Mohamed Ali then reached Cairo, arriving there in October 1807.

Al-Jabarti said in this regard: "On the third of Sha'ban 1222 (October 6, 1807), the Pasha arrived at the coast of Bulaq. They fired cannons from the citadel to mark his arrival, and they laid siege to him for three days. It so happened that upon his return from Alexandria, the Pasha disembarked in a small ship, accompanied by Hassan Pasha Tahir and Suleiman Agha, the former governor. The ship capsized, and the three of them were on the verge of drowning. Some of them clung to the hull of the ship, but another ship caught up with them and saved them from sinking. They emerged safely. This was at the time of his departure."

"When news of the evacuation from Alexandria reached Istanbul, Sultan Mahmud rejoiced greatly due to the hostility between Turkey and England at the time. He sent a messenger to Mohamed Ali expressing his joy and presenting him with a valuable sword and robe of honor. He also bestowed ranks and valuable robes on Ibrahim Bey, Tousoun Bey, Hassan Pasha, Tahir Pasha, Sayyid Omar Makram, Abdeen Bey, Omar Bey, and Salih Qush."

The Turkish government returned Ibrahim Bey (Pasha) to Egypt, and he was a hostage in Istanbul until Mohamed Ali paid the four thousand purses he had pledged to pay. The government released him as a sign of the Egyptian army's victory.

In short, the failure of the British campaign (1807) and the defeat of the English at Rosetta and Al-Hammad are pages of glory and pride for Egypt and the Egyptians. It is wrong for historians to unanimously call this campaign Fraser's campaign while calling Bonaparte's campaign the French campaign. The correct thing to call it the English campaign and not Fraser's campaign is that this campaign was nothing but the campaign of a great power that wanted to occupy Egypt, so that the British Empire would extend to the East. England wanted to seize the city of Alexandria, based on the request of the British House of Commons to transfer forces to Egypt to seize Alexandria to prevent the French from setting foot there and to impose a protectorate on Egypt to force it to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain at all times [1]. This would be done with the help of traitors and agents from the Mamluk Beys, in agreement with Mohamed Bey Al-Alfi. The council also requested the selection of an officer from the army command, and the choice fell on General Fraser to lead the campaign.

But Egypt did not surrender to this invasion. Rather, it resisted it with all its might and

strength. The nation emerged with the same spirit with which it rose against the French campaign—a spirit of resistance, sacrifice, and defense—until the campaign ended in disappointment and failure. Rosetta's defeat of the British campaign delayed the occupation of Egypt for seventy-five years, a development that occurred in 1882.

The campaign confirmed that Al-Azhar and its scholars have, throughout the ages, been a beacon of resistance against the nation's enemies, just as they have been a beacon of knowledge and enlightenment. From the spaciousness of Al-Azhar, under the leadership of its scholars, the resistance emerged to defend the nation against the dangers of occupiers and avaricious invaders. This is evident in their resistance to the British campaign against Egypt. The Egyptian people, led by their scholars, bore the burden of the struggle to repel the British aggression. Mohamed Ali was preoccupied at the time with fighting the Mamluks in Upper Egypt. Al-Azhar scholars, led by Sheikh Abdullah al-Sharqawi and the head of the Ashrafs, Sayyid Omar Makram, along with senior state officials and some notables, held several meetings in Cairo. To confront the aggression, it was widely believed that the campaign would advance on Cairo, as the French had done before. Therefore, senior scholars wrote to Mohamed Ali urging him and his soldiers to return, as there were more important and priority matters. However, Mohamed Ali was slow to arrive. Meanwhile, the people of Damanhur sent a letter to Sayyid Omar Makram on Muharram 23, 1222 AH (April 2, 1807 AD), informing him that the governor of Damanhur and its garrison had fled with all their weapons upon learning of the British forces' landing in Alexandria. They requested assistance, as they lacked the weapons to defend themselves.

Omar Makram did not wait for Mohamed Ali's arrival, but took over the leadership of the popular resistance and worked to organize it. He called on the people of Cairo to take up arms and prepare to fight the British. He also ordered the suspension of studies at Al-Azhar so that teachers and students could devote themselves to jihad against the British.

On Muharram 28, 1222 AH (April 7, 1807 AD), a large meeting was held at the home of the Ottoman judge, attended by Omar Makram, Sheikh Abdullah al-Sharqawi, Sheikh Mohamed al-Amir, and other senior Al-Azhar scholars, as well as a number of state officers and officials. The scholars demanded that Ottoman soldiers refrain from looting and plunder, stand united with the people against the British threat, and prepare to fight and expel them. At this meeting, it was decided to dig a trench and build a wall north of Cairo to prevent the British from entering the capital if they advanced on it.

The next day, senior Al-Azhar scholars, the judge, and the notables of Cairo gathered and headed to Bulaq to work on re-excavating the trench the French had built during the French campaign in Egypt. Large crowds of people from various social classes and religions accompanied them to dig the trench, repair the walls, and erect barricades. This demonstrated the spirit of cooperation among the Egyptian people during this difficult time. Omar Makram, accompanied by crowds of Egyptians, was keen to follow up on the work every morning.

A tent was set up for him, where he sometimes stayed throughout the day. His presence played a role in inspiring enthusiasm among everyone and motivating them to exert their utmost efforts. Al-Azhar scholars also worked to aid the governor of Rosetta, who had sent a request for men and weapons to confront the British once again seeking revenge. Officials and scholars rushed to dispatch a force of fighters and wrote letters to the Bedouins of Buhaira, urging them to join the jihad and aid their brothers in Rosetta.

When the British launched a retaliatory campaign against Rosetta equipped with heavy artillery, they occupied the village of Al-Hammad, which is located south of Rosetta, to besiege the city and began to bombard it with artillery. This prompted Sayyid Hassan Krit, the head of the Rosetta Ashrafs, to write to Sayyid Omar Makram, asking him to quickly supply them with men and weapons. Accordingly, he called on the scholars of Al-Azhar to hold a general meeting on the first of Safar (April 9), in which Omar Makram read the letter of the head of the Rosetta Ashrafs to the people, asking them to hurry to their aid. Omar Makram commented on the letter, explaining to the people the seriousness of the situation in Rosetta and urging them to go and support their brothers there. Omar Makram's letter had a strong impact on the people, so they responded to his call and took up arms. Among them were crowds of Al-Azharites, Moroccans, Turks from Khan El-Khalili, and many from Adawiya, Asyutiya, and the people of the country. The next day, these crowds, led by the scholars, marched to Mohamed Ali's deputy, asking his permission to go to Rosetta. He refused their travel until Mohamed Ali returned from Upper Egypt and presented the matter of their travel to him, but he did not care. Many of them rejected this and traveled to aid their brothers.

Immediately upon Mohamed Ali's return to Cairo on Safar 3 (April 11), the leading scholars and notables met with him and discussed the campaign and their desire to march with the people and soldiers to Rosetta to participate in the country's defense. Mohamed Ali rejected

their request, saying, "The people of the country are not required to march, but rather to provide financial support for the army."

Mohamed Ali's response shocked the scholars, as it was a clear declaration of his unwillingness to allow the people or the leaders to interfere in the administration of government or the defense of the country. To implement his idea, Mohamed Ali obliged Sayyid Umar Makram to collect a thousand bags (five thousand pounds) to cover the expenses of the soldiers going to fight the British. Umar Makram agreed to distribute the amount and collect it from the people as long as it would be spent on the forces going to aid Rosetta, especially after he received a succession of distress messages from Rosetta asking for help and support after the British besieged and attacked Rosetta.

Sayyid Umar Makram informed Mohamed Ali of these distress calls, so he worked to prepare a campaign led by his deputy that marched towards Rosetta where it clashed with the British forces in the village of Al-Hammad. The war lasted for about two weeks, ending in a crushing defeat for the British campaign, with a large number of its members killed and captured, and those who remained retreated to Alexandria. On the political level, the scholars of Al-Azhar played a prominent role in mediating between Mohamed Ali and the Mamluks to end the conflict and conclude a peace treaty between them so that they could devote themselves to confronting the British. Mohamed Ali had sent a message to the scholars of Al-Azhar and Omar Makram asking them to play a mediating role in the peace treaty between him and the Mamluk princes, and that he accepted their conditions and urged them to hasten to conclude the peace treaty.

The scholars responded to Mohamed Ali's request and wrote to the Mamluk princes, who sent a response - which arrived in Cairo on the 12th of Safar (April 20) - in which they deliberately procrastinated and delayed for fear of becoming involved in a peace treaty with Mohamed Ali, which would miss the opportunity to join the campaign if it succeeded. Following the Battle of El-Hammad, Mohamed Ali wanted to march on Alexandria to expel the British, but he delayed taking this step as he wanted to resume peace negotiations with the Mamluks in order to neutralize them in his next battle with the British. He feared that they would attack Cairo during his absence, as they were on the outskirts of Beni Suef.

Mohamed Ali initially requested the mediation of the French consul in Egypt to carry out the peace, but the negotiations faltered. The Mamluks expressed their desire to send Sheikh Abdullah al-Sharqawi, Sheikh Mohamed al-Amir, and Sayyid Umar Makram to carry out

the peace. Mohamed Ali responded to their request in principle, but he replaced these three with others: Sheikh Sulayman al-Fayyumi, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Sijini, and Sheikh Mohamed al-Dawakhli to carry out the peace, and he gave them full powers to conclude the peace. The three sheikhs headed to Upper Egypt to conduct negotiations with the Mamluks. However, these scholars' efforts did not yield a positive outcome, due to the Mamluk beys' adherence to numerous conditions that made it impossible to reach the desired agreement, their divisions within themselves, their hatred of Mohamed Ali, and their vacillating stance toward the British campaign. On the social front, the scholars of Al-Azhar played an important role in redressing grievances and defending the rights of Egyptians. Al-Azhar and its men provided them with a refuge from the oppression of Mohamed Ali's soldiers.

Following the Battle of Al-Hammad, Mohamed Ali's soldiers spread throughout the village and plundered its property, women, and livestock, considering it a house of war due to the British presence there. They then moved to Rosetta, imposing tribute on its residents, and confiscating the rice crop. This prompted the residents of Rosetta and the head of the Ashrafs there to write to Omar Makram, urging him to end the looting and plundering. Omar Makram intervened with Mohamed Ali, who ordered the soldiers to halt their attacks on the residents and their property.

The people of Cairo were subjected to many injustices at the hands of Mohamed Ali and his soldiers while he was in Imbaba, where he set up a camp pretending to be traveling to fight the British. Al-Jabarti talks about these injustices, saying: "The military groups went out to the Bulaq area and the sea coast (the Nile) and began to take whatever mules, donkeys and camels they could find. They continued to go in and out... for days they continued to kidnap the animals. The water carriers refused to transport water from the sea until water became scarce and its price rose and people became thirsty... They also asked for the mill horses to pull the cannons and carts until the mills stopped grinding flour... They also asked for dirhams from the group of the qabbaniyya, the lumberjacks and the sellers of dried fish... so they closed their shops and fled and took refuge in Al-Azhar Mosque." As a result, the scholars of Al-Azhar intervened with Mohamed Ali to lift these injustices from the people. Mohamed Ali accepted their mediation and wrote a security order to that effect for the affected groups [43].

The role of Al-Azhar scholars in defeating the British campaign was clear in the effort they exerted to inflame the religious and national feelings of the Egyptians to volunteer to fight

the British and to aid their brothers in Rosetta. The Egyptians rushed with all their energy and enthusiasm, under the supervision of Al-Azhar scholars, to fortify Cairo. They were viewed not only as men of religion, but as men of jihad and defense of the land and the nation, defending the interests of the Egyptians and redressing their injustices. They also played a role in Mohamed Ali obtaining the money he needed to manage defense affairs until he was able to expel the British from Egypt, thus recording a new page to be added to the record of their honorable national history. The testimony of Captain Vincenzo Taberna, Secretary General of the British Campaign in Egypt, confirmed that the forces that confronted the first campaign numbered more than 450 men, while the forces that attacked El-Hammad were 2,000. The campaign witnessed betrayal by the Turks and Albanians, as the Turkish and Albanian garrison were confirmed to have fled the city.

The forces defending the city numbered more than 1,200 armed men, and approximately 200 were injured during the siege. Regarding Turkish complicity, they concluded a treaty with England to station British forces in Alexandria. The Turkish forces stationed in Alexandria or Rosetta did not intervene. The Turkish garrison and warships assigned to the city's naval defense surrendered without engaging the British fleet. The Turkish military forces did not intervene to defend Alexandria or Rosetta, and the Turks did not provide any assistance during either campaign. This complicity led to popular support for Mohamed Ali, who subsequently consolidated his authority over all the ports.

Therefore, the claim that Ali Bey al-Salankli ordered the boats to be moved to the eastern bank to prevent the city's inhabitants from fleeing is false. The move was made to prevent the garrison soldiers and the Albanians from escaping, and the result was that they were able to escape by throwing themselves into the Nile, including the commander of the Albanian forces. In the testimony of Mr. Joseph Aziz, the first translator for the British mission in Egypt and Major Messitt's agent in Cairo, he confirmed the betrayal of the Turks and Albanians, as 1,500 of their soldiers surrendered when the British arrived in Alexandria and hid in distant houses in the city to avoid confrontation with the British forces.

Confirming the agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Sultan are the proposals submitted to President Effendi, stating that it would be appropriate for the Ottoman government to petition His Majesty the King to send a British force without delay to Alexandria. The purpose was to maintain public order and defend Egypt against attack by France. Stratton's letter to Lord Hawkesbury, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated January 21,

1804, included the hypothesis of the occupation of Alexandria, not only as a measure taken in accordance with the Sublime Porte's wishes, but as an operation that must be carried out against its will.

These letters also revealed the conspiratorial role of the Sublime Porte, which had concluded an agreement with Britain allowing the occupation of the ports, thus giving the green light for this campaign. After the campaign was about to begin, the Sublime Porte sought to evade this decision and appear to oppose the campaign. The governor of Egypt was ordered to place every vulnerable part of the country on the defensive and to resist the landing of British forces by all possible means, even though Alexandria did not fall under the jurisdiction of the governor, but rather under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Sultan himself.

Documents reveal that the Sublime Porte issued these orders following negotiations with the British ambassador and between him and Russia, warning of measures to protect Turkish property. Strangely, these instructions never reached the governor. Their authenticity is questionable, making it appear that the Sublime Porte opposed the campaign. However, we will see the blatant collusion when the Ottoman garrison and fleet were ordered to withdraw, facilitating the campaign's capture of Alexandria and Rosetta.

The British army seized the Ottoman ships, leaving the city to face the campaign with minimal defenses. However, the arrogance that swept through the British commanders and their ignorance of military rules and geography led the campaign to fall into the trap of resistance in Rosetta, resulting in a defeat that tipped the scales and ended with disastrous consequences, not only for Britain but also for the Mamluks and the Sublime Porte.

The defeat of the British army at Rosetta ended the political life of King George III, who made no political decisions after the campaign and became insane. The ministry of William Wyndham was dissolved, and the House of Commons, headed by Lord Hawick, was dissolved on March 31, 1807. Both William Marsden Isaac, the First Secretary of the Admiralty, and Major General Henry Edward Fox, Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Forces, retired. It also led to a coup against the Ottoman Sultan Selim III, who had approved the campaign.

He was deposed on May 29, 1807, and replaced by his cousin Mustafa IV (1807-1808), who imprisoned his predecessor and then killed him on July 28, 1808. The Battle of Rosetta was the final nail in the coffin of this sultan, as it paved the way for the major powers to arrange for the elimination of the Ottoman Empire. In the testimony of Mr. Joseph Aziz, the chief

interpreter of the British mission in Egypt and Major Messitt's agent in Cairo, he confirmed the treachery of the Turks and Albanians, as 1,500 of them surrendered when the British reached Alexandria and hid in distant houses in the city to avoid confrontation with the British forces.

Major Messitt revealed that as early as April 10, it was reported that Mohamed Ali himself was marching to the relief of Rosetta with 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry. On the 19th, he wrote: "Everything we have heard during these last few days regarding Mohamed Ali has proven to be false." In doing so, he followed the British army's approach when it spread lies about the number of its forces at the start of the campaign, in order to spread fear among the citizens. In fact, information had emerged indicating that Mohamed Ali had left for Upper Egypt about a month earlier, and that his Albanian soldiers were in his service at the time and had not participated in the defense of Alexandria or Rosetta.

Letters confirmed that the British forces had begun to regroup on the morning of April 21, while the troops had arrived the previous evening, having traveled forty miles (64 kilometers) in three days. The battle had already been decided. Therefore, it is understood that Mohamed Ali seized the opportunity of Rosetta's victory to claim it for himself. He sent his troops, which arrived with the surrender of the British forces, to achieve his goal of capturing Rosetta and Alexandria.

This was despite the fact that the victors were the people of Rosetta alone, along with those Egyptians who volunteered to support them. Because Mohamed Ali's objectives were clear, Omar Makram, the chief of the Ashrafs, whom most Egyptians respected and revered for his patriotic role, warned the governor of Rosetta that the British forces that had captured Alexandria were undoubtedly heading to Rosetta to seize it, with the goal of marching on Cairo. In his letter to the governor of Rosetta, he recommended the city's fortifications and preparations for the invasion, just as the people of Cairo had done, suspending classes at Al-Azhar Mosque and beginning to dig trenches and erect barricades. The letter also hinted to Salankali that he should not rely on Mohamed Ali's soldiers, as he was busy fighting the Mamluks in Upper Egypt.

More dangerously, he should not rely on the Ottoman officers and soldiers stationed in Cairo, as they had fled upon hearing news of the campaign's arrival in Alexandria, most of them fleeing to the Levant. Makram's warning to Salankali was clear from the lines of his letter: Only its people will defend Rosetta. The Turks and Albanians quickly fled the British forces

that had invaded the city, leaving the people to fight the enemy.

Therefore, the claim that Ali Bey al-Salankli ordered the boats to be moved to the east bank to prevent the city's residents from fleeing is completely false. The move was not to prevent the residents, but to prevent the Ottoman garrison soldiers and the Albanians from escaping. Their panic reached such an extent that they managed to escape by throwing themselves into the Nile, including the commander of the Albanian forces. A large number of them crossed the Nile in boats and on wooden planks [44].

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